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ABSTRACT

"Satellite in my eyes-Like a diamond in the sky-How I wonder. "I
On the evening of October 4, 1957, one event would change the world
forever. With the launch of the first satellite, Sputnik, the whole of
civilization was ushered into a new periodof technology and discovery. No
one who witnessed the birth of the satellite age almost 60 years ago could
have envisioned the indispensable impact satellite technology would have
in the modern era. One of the most significant benefits of satellite
technology has been the use of multiple satellites to determine precise
location information from anywhere on the planet. This use, commonly
known as GPS (globalpositioningsystem), has become so commonplace in
our world that a considerableportion of the world population uses it daily.
In addition, states capitalized on the use of GPS technology in the
mandatory monitoring of sex offenders through the creation of
satellite-basedmonitoring (SBM) programs aimed at the protection of the
public by curbing recidivism of known sex offenders. Many legal
challengesfollowed. Then, in the 2012 United States Supreme Court case
ofUnited States v. Jones, satellites would again change the world.
The Supreme Court, through its Jones decision, would usher in a new
paradigm of search law when it held that the warrantless installation and
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GPS monitoring of a suspect's vehicle constituted a search. The question
remained open, however, regarding the effect the Jones decision would
have on the GPS monitoring of sex offenders. In the 2015 Supreme Court
term, the Court answered this question. In Grady v. North Carolina, the
Court ruled that SBM programs constituted a Fourth Amendment search.
Despite its ruling, the Court left open the "ultimate question" of whether
SBM programs are reasonable warrantless searches. This Article will
utilize the framework left by the Grady decision and attempt to answer the
"ultimate question" for North Carolina: is the lifetime SBM program
reasonableunder the FourthAmendment? The Article will conclude that a
court will likely hold that North Carolina'sSBM program is a reasonable
search. When consideringthis result, four crucial observations appear:
(1)In assessing reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment,
the Supreme Court has struggled to consistently maintain a
clear direction. Over time, the Court has grappled with
whether to require a warrant or to inquire into reasonableness
alone. As a result of this dilemma, a number of cases have
sprung up to create classificationsof warrantless searches that
defy a common and consistent theme.
(2) The Grady decision's cited cases Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton and Samson v. California provide at least two
distinct reasonableness scaffolds to build upon: (1) a "special
needs" exception, requiring some need beyond traditionallaw
enforcement; and (2) a general reasonablenessexception based
upon a particularcontext, such as a diminished expectation of
privacy.
(3) While it is likely that the North Carolina courts will
conclude that the SBM program is reasonable, such a decision
will constitute a Pyrrhicvictory, won at the considerablecost to
individualprivacy. Veritably, if the court upholds lifetime GPS
monitoring of individuals as reasonable, such a ruling pushes
the outside of the envelope for suspicionless and warrantless
searches.
(4) Should the High Court eventually consider the "ultimate
question" left open in its Grady decision, the resolution is in
doubt. In fact, the whole aggregate of its pronouncements on
reasonableness, both past and future, has been shrouded in
ambiguity. Currently, the Court is ensnared in darkness over
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the future of its ideological understanding of the Fourth
Amendment. Justice Scalia's recent death casts a long shadow
over the evenly divided Court. Only time will tell if the Court
will attempt to view reasonableness through a preference for
warrants or if it chooses to continue to track reasonableness
alone in the universe of uncertainty and unpredictabilitythat is
the Fourth Amendment. For now, all we can do is look to the
heavens and wonder.
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INTRODUCTION

On October 4, 1957, the world changed forever.2 Countless numbers
of planet Earth's citizens raced outside and looked to the heavens for a
glimpse of a small metallic object, the size of a beach ball, hurtling through
space at an astonishing rate of 18,000 miles per hour.3 Many, through the
use of ham radio receivers, listened for the eerie signal, "beep, beep, beep,"
emitting from the object every ninety-eight minutes as it completed its orbit
around the world.4 Undeniably, "[o]n Friday, October 4, 1957, the Soviets
had orbited the world's first artificial satellite. Anyone who had doubted
its existence could walk into the backyard just after sunset and see it." 5
With the launch of the satellite Sputnik, which means "fellow-traveler of
the Earth," 6 the whole of civilization was ushered into a new period of
technology and discovery.
No one who witnessed the birth of the satellite age almost sixty years
ago could have envisioned the indispensable impact satellite technology
would have in the modem era. One of the most significant benefits of
satellite technology has been the use of GPS (global positioning system)
2. See Sputnik and The Dawn of the Space Age, NASA.GOv (Oct. 10, 2007),
http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/ [https://perma.cc/T4V9-EA5L].
3. Id
4. Id;

see

also

First

Contact:

Sputnik,

NASA.GOv

https://www.nasa.gov/missionpages/explorer/sputnik-20071002.html
AY-K8MC].
5.

(Oct.

2,

2007),

[https://perma.cc/28

MIKE GRAY, ANGLE OF ATTACK: HARRISON STORMS AND THE RACE TO THE MOON 31

(1994).
6.

LOYD S. SWENSON ET AL., THIS NEW OCEAN: A HISTORY OF PROJECT MERCURY 28

(1998).
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technology, which has become so commonplace in our world that many use

it daily.7
Soon, states capitalized on the use of GPS technology in the
mandatory monitoring of sex offenders through the creation of
satellite-based monitoring (SBM) programs,8 aimed at the protection of the
public by reducing recidivism of known sex offenders. Many legal
challenges followed. Then, in the 2012 Supreme Court case of United
States v. Jones,9 satellites would again change the world. This time
satellites, and the way the government used them, would transform our
understanding of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Supreme Court, through its Jones decision,
would usher in a new paradigm of search law when it held that the
warrantless installation and GPS monitoring of a suspect's vehicle
constituted a search.' 0
The question remained open, however, regarding the effect the Jones
decision would have on the GPS monitoring of sex offenders. In the 2015
Supreme Court term, the Court answered this question. In Grady v. North
Carolina," the Court ruled that SBM programs constituted a Fourth
Amendment search.1 2 Despite its ruling, the Court left open the "ultimate
question" of whether SBM programs are reasonable warrantless searches.13
This Article will utilize the framework left by the Grady decision and
attempt to answer this "ultimate question" for North Carolina: is the
lifetime SBM program reasonable under the Fourth Amendment? The

7. See Kathryn Zickuhr, Three-Quarters of Smartphone Owners Use Location-Based
Services, PEW RES. CTR. (May 11, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/05/1 l/three-

quarters-of-smartphone-owners-use-location-based-services/

[https://perma.cc/WK3V-QT

VA]. In the article, Zickuhr explains:
Almost three-quarters (74%) of smartphone owners get real-time location-based

information on their phones as of February 2012, up from 55% in May 2011. This
increase coincides with a rise in smartphone ownership overall (from 35% of
adults in 2011 to 46% in 2012), which means that the overall proportion of U.S.
adults who get location-based information has almost doubled over that time

period-from 23% in May 2011 to 41% in February 2012.
Id.
8. Throughout this Article, the terms "satellite-based monitoring" (SBM), "lifetime
monitoring,"

"GPS monitoring,"

and "electronic

monitoring" are synonymous

with

GPS-based monitoring of sex offenders.
9. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 946 (2012).
10. Id. at 949.
11. Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015) (per curiam).
12. Id. at 1371.
13. Id
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Article will conclude that the lower courts will likely hold the SBM
program is a reasonable search.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of North Carolina's lifetime
sex offender SBM program and legal challenges to its application. Later,
Part I shifts to an introduction of modem search analysis, culminating in
the Supreme Court's decision in Jones. This development in the law
provides the impetus for the case of Grady v. North Carolina,challenging
the SBM program as an unreasonable search.
Part II presents the analytical framework the Grady Court has
provided as guidance in assessing reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment. It examines the cited cases of Vernonia School District47J v.
Acton and Samson v. California, and attempts to traverse the confusing
quagmire of a balancing of interests evaluation. There, it will identify two
possible paths to resolve the "ultimate question."
Part III of this Article explores the only two cases that have
considered reasonableness of SBM programs since the Grady decision. In
doing so, it will carefully consider the insights provided by the court
decisions and contemplate their application to North Carolina's SBM
program. Additionally, two possible routes of analysis will be identified: a
"special needs" search and a "context-specific" balancing of interests test.
Part IV will apply the standards established in both of the Supreme
Court's decisions, as well as the guidance from the analysis of the lower
courts that have considered this issue. There, North Carolina's SBM
program will be evaluated under both the "special needs" search analysis,
as well as the "context-specific" balancing of the interests test. In
particular, attention will be paid to empirical evidence supporting the
governmental interests as well as a thorough examination of the possible
diminished expectation of privacy interests in sex offenders.
Finally, Part V will conclude that North Carolina's SBM program is
likely reasonable. It warns, however, the cost to privacy will be
considerable. In addition, it offers some final thoughts on reasonableness,
addressing the concern of the potential for ideological gridlock, given the
current vacancy of the Court due to Justice Scalia's sudden death.
I.

"WHAT'S THE FREQUENCY, KENNETH":14 TRACKING NORTH
CAROLINA'S SEX OFFENDER MONITORING

In order to explicate the issues concerning GPS monitoring from the
skies above North Carolina, substantial groundwork must be established
below. What exactly is at stake? How does lifetime monitoring implicate
14. R.E.M., What's the Frequency, Kenneth?, on MONSTER (Warner Bros. 1994).
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the Fourth Amendment generally and how does North Carolina's SBM
program impact Torrey Dale Grady, the Petitioner in Grady v. North
Carolina, specifically?
A.

"Look Up, Look Down, All Around, Hey Satellite"15 : North Carolina's
Lifetime Satellite-BasedMonitoring Statutes

Since 2006, North Carolina has maintained some version of "a sex
offender monitoring program that uses a continuous satellite-based
monitoring system." 1 6 As the law currently reads, the State requires
lifetime enrollment in the satellite-based monitoring program for four
classifications of individuals: (1) a sexually violent predator;1 7 (2) a
recidivist18 with a reportable conviction; 9 (3) an offender who committed
15.

DAVE MATFHEWS BAND, supra note 1.

16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.40 (2015); see also James Markham, Sex Offender
Registration and Monitoring 13 (Nov. 19, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
UNC School of Government Chapel Hill, NC) ("Confusing to begin with, the law has been
modified several times since its enactment in 2006, making it difficult to apply.").
17. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.6(6) (2015) ('Sexually violent predator' means a
person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in sexually
violent offenses directed at strangers or at a person with whom a relationship has been
established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.").
18. See id. § 14-208.6(2b) ("'Recidivist' means a person who has a prior conviction for
an offense that is described in G.S. 14-208.6(4).").
19. See id. § 14-208.6(4). The statute defines "reportable conviction" as:
a. A final conviction for an offense against a minor, a sexually violent offense, or
an attempt to commit any of those offenses unless the conviction is for aiding and
abetting. A final conviction for aiding and abetting is a reportable conviction only
if the court sentencing the individual finds that the registration of that individual
under this Article furthers the purposes of this Article as stated in G.S. 14-208.5.
b. A final conviction in another state of an offense, which if committed in this
State, is substantially similar to an offense against a minor or a sexually violent
offense as defined by this section, or a final conviction in another state of an
offense that requires registration under the sex offender registration statutes of that
state.
c. A final conviction in a federal jurisdiction (including a court martial) of an
offense, which is substantially similar to an offense against a minor or a sexually
violent offense as defined by this section.
d. A final conviction for a violation of G.S. 14-202(d), (e), (f), (g), or (h), or a
second or subsequent conviction for a violation of G.S. 14-202(a), (al), or (c),
only if the court sentencing the individual issues an order pursuant to
G.S 14-202(1) requiring the individual to register.
e. A final conviction for a violation of G.S. 14-43.14, only if the court sentencing
the individual issues an order pursuant to G.S. 14-43.14(e) requiring the individual
to register.
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an aggravated offense; 20 or (4) an offender who committed a crime of
statutory rape21 or statutory sexual offense 2 2 of a child by an adult. 23 The
determination of whether an offender is subject to lifetime monitoring can
occur in two different scenarios: (1) upon conviction of a reportable
conviction 24 during the sentencing phase of the conviction; 25 or (2) a
"bring-back" hearing where the offender has been convicted of a reportable
conviction, but "there has been no determination by a court on whether the
offender shall be required to enroll in satellite-based monitoring." 2 6
In the case of a "bring-back" hearing, an "initial determination" is
made by the Division of Adult Correction (DAC) to determine whether the
individual is required to enroll in lifetime electronic monitoring.2 7 If the
DAC determines that an individual falls within one of the statutory
categories for lifetime monitoring, written notice is sent to the individual,
and a satellite-based monitoring determination hearing is scheduled in
superior court by the district attorney. 28 At the hearing, if the court
concludes that the individual meets the statutory requirements (e.g., that the
offender is a "recidivist"), the court "shall order the offender to enroll in
satellite-based monitoring for life." 2 9
After an offender has been ordered to receive lifetime electronic
monitoring, the State issues the offender three pieces of equipment: (1) an
ankle transmitter that is worn at all times; (2) a miniature tracking device
Id.
20. See id. § 14-208.6(la) ('Aggravated offense' means any criminal offense that
includes either of the following: (i) engaging in a sexual act involving vaginal, anal, or oral
penetration with a victim of any age through the use of force or the threat of serious
violence; or (ii) engaging in a sexual act involving vaginal, anal, or oral penetration with a
victim who is less than 12 years old.").
21. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.23 (2015).
22. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.28 (2015).
23. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.40A(c) (stating "the court shall order the offender to
enroll in a satellite-based monitoring program for life").
24. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.6(4).
25. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.40A(a).
26. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.40B(a) (2015).
27. See id.
28. See id. § 14-208.40B(b) ("The Division of Adult Correction shall notify the
offender of the Division of Adult Correction's determination and the date of the scheduled
hearing by certified mail sent to the address provided by the offender pursuant to
G.S. 14-208.7. The hearing shall be scheduled no sooner than 15 days from the date the
notification is mailed. Receipt of notification shall be presumed to be the date indicated by
the certified mail receipt. Upon the court's determination that the offender is indigent and
entitled to counsel, the court shall assign counsel to represent the offender at the hearing
pursuant to rules adopted by the Office of Indigent Defense Services.").
29. See id. § 14-208.40B(c).
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(MTD) that must be visibly worn on a belt or around the shoulder; and (3) a
charging unit that is used to recharge the MTD. 3 0 The MTD, which cannot
be covered up by clothing, contains the GPS receiver, and it is
electronically "tethered" to the ankle transmitter. 3 1 While the GPS receiver
and ankle transmitter provide a "near real-time log" of the offender's
movements, "only periodic checks are conducted on the movements of
unsupervised participants, going back a day or two at a time." 32 Under the
monitoring system, while offenders are generally free to move about the
State, the SBM program has several noted limitations, including activity
restrictions due to loss of signal alerts 3 3 and travel impediments. 34 As a
result of these limitations and restrictions from the required enrollment in
the lifetime monitoring program, a number of individuals have raised
constitutional and legal challenges.35
30. See State v. Bowditch, 700 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. 2010). Note that in Bowditch, the
State provided a considerable amount of information in its brief to describe the equipment
used in electronic monitoring. In addition, the State explained in its brief that there existed
both an "old" MTD and a "new" MTD that is "a little lighter and the transmitter's smaller
and can be charged like a cell phone." See New Brief for the State-Appellant at 8,
Bowditch, 700 S.E.2d 1 (No. 448PA-09). Indeed, the North Carolina Supreme Court used a
considerable amount of the information from the State's brief to explain the monitoring
process. In the case of Grady, however, the State asserted:
[The defendant] has established no factual record outlining the specifics of North
Carolina's SBM program, how it operates, the equipment it uses, or the scope of
any restrictions it imposes on an enrolled sex offender. Instead, [Grady] relies on
the description of the program as it existed in 2009, as outlined in [Bowditch].
See Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 6, Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368
(2015) (No. 14-593). For the purpose of this Article, and since the State refused to
articulate the "current procedures" for satellite-based monitoring, the author will use the
evidence provided by the State and the North Carolina Supreme Court from the Bowditch
case.
31. Bowditch, 700 S.E.2d at 4.
32. See id. (noting that if "personnel observe certain patterns of movement or locations
that a participant appears to frequent, they may contact local officers to identify the area and
look for vulnerable sites, such as schools or day-care centers").
33. See id. ("Entrance into some buildings disrupts the GPS signal, requiring the
participant to go outside to reestablish satellite connection. Submerging the ankle bracelet
in three feet or more of water generates a 'bracelet gone' alert.").
34. See id. at 5 ("It is possible, though, that the GPS signal may be lost in remote areas,
and commercial airline flight is likely limited due to security regulations.").
35. Id. at 1; see also State v. Hagerman, 700 S.E.2d 225, 225 (N.C. 2010) (per curiam)
(affirming the North Carolina Court of Appeals decision that the State did not need to
present facts in an indictment or prove any facts beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury in
order to subject the defendant to SBM); State v. Wagoner, 700 S.E.2d 222, 223 (N.C. 2010)
(per curiam) (affirming the North Carolina Court of Appeals decision that SBM does not
violate double jeopardy); State v. Jones, 750 S.E.2d 883, 886 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (holding
SBM does not violate the Fourth Amendment); State v. Martin, 735 S.E.2d 238, 239 (N.C.
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One of the most significant battlegrounds in the fight over SBM
monitoring has been whether North Carolina's monitoring program is a
criminal punishment, and therefore, implicates and potentially violates ex
post facto prohibitions.3 6 Specifically, defendants who pled guilty to
offenses that occurred before the legislature enacted the SBM program
claimed the program violates ex post facto in that it punishes the offender
further by requiring satellite-based monitoring now, based upon offenses
prior to the program's enactment.37 The North Carolina Supreme Court
concluded the SBM program was intended by the legislature to be civil in
nature.3 8 Additionally, the Court examined both the purpose and effect of
the monitoring provisions, and determined neither negates the civil intent
behind the program.3 9 Since SBM is a civil program, the restriction on ex
post facto laws do not apply. 40 Despite this decision, the battles would
continue to rage over the legality of North Carolina's SBM program. 4
Surprisingly, the greatest impact on the landscape of the law's validity
would come not from the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution, but
from the Fourth Amendment. And under the resurrection of a "search"
analysis from long ago, 42 the issue of satellite-based monitoring in North
Carolina would find its way to the United States Supreme Court.
Ct. App. 2012) (establishing that SBM does not violate the Fourth Amendment); State v.
Manning, 727 S.E.2d 380, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (determining that SBM does not
infringe upon the constitutional right to travel); State v. Bare, 677 S.E.2d 518, 531 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2009) (concluding that SBM program does not violate Ex Post Facto Clause).
36. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit;
make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any
Title of Nobility."); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 16 ("Retrospective laws, punishing acts committed
before the existence of such laws and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive,
unjust, and incompatible with liberty, and therefore no ex post facto law shall be enacted.
No law taxing retrospectively sales, purchases, or other acts previously done shall be
enacted.").
37. State v. Bowditch, 700 S.E.2d 1, 2 (N.C. 2010).
38. Id. at 13 ("The SBM program at issue was enacted with the intent to create a civil,
regulatory scheme to protect citizens of our state from the threat posed by the recidivist
tendencies of convicted sex offenders.").
39. Id.
40. Id. at 6 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370-71 (1997) and Smith v.
Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003), and concluding, "The instant case falls within the
framework established by those precedents for civil, regulatory schemes that address the
recidivist tendencies of convicted sex offenders").
41. Seesupranote34.
42. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (stating that a search occurred when
the "[g]overnment physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining
information").
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"Who's the King of Your Satellite Castle"43: The Impact of the
ChangingNature ofFourth Amendment Search Law-Property,
Privacy, and Technology

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of individuals to be
"secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures
."44 The question about what exactly establishes
a "search" is not an easy one.4 5 Tracking the history of the Supreme
Court's exposition of what constitutes a search will likely leave one lost
and bewildered.46 At the risk of appearing cynical or oversimplifying the
problem, most of the judicial decisions appear at times to have no real
relation to each other, and often in direct conflict with previous
understandings or misunderstandings of search law.4 7 If there are any
blazes along the trail to assist in our wandering when it comes to searches
generally, or satellite-based monitoring specifically, the focus should be on
three distinct areas: privacy, property, and the impact of technology to
search law.
When considering the areas of privacy and property prior to the Grady
decision, Fourth Amendment decisions could be placed on a timeline
around three critical periods of interpretation: pre-Katz property-based
analysis, 48 post-Katz 49 but pre-Jones privacy-based analysis, and
43. DAVE MATrHEWS BAND, supra note 1.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

45. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (holding police inspection
of the curtilage of a home from a helicopter flying at 400 feet was not a search); California

v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (holding police inspection of garbage left on
street curb was not a search); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (holding
police inspection of curtilage of a home from a fixed-winged aircraft flying at 1,000 feet
was not a search); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179-81 (1984) (holding police
trespass on "open fields" of private property was not a search); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.

735, 744 (1979) (holding police inspection of telephone numbers dialed was not a search);
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-53 (1971) (holding police use of a wired
informant was not a search).

46. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("Since searches and seizures play such a frequent role in federal criminal trials,
it is most important that the law on searches and seizures by which prosecutors and trial
judges are to be guided should be as clear and unconfusing as the nature of the subject
matter permits. The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not-to put it mildly-run smooth.").
47. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment FirstPrinciples, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757,

758 (1994) ("The result is a vast jumble of judicial pronouncements that is not merely
complex and contradictory, but often perverse.").

48. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456-67 (1928) (stating that the
government's installation of wiretaps on the phone lines and monitoring of calls was not a

search since there was no physical invasion of the suspects' home).
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Currently, in the
post-Jonesso property and privacy-based tests."
post-Jones era, there are two separate tests to establish whether the Fourth
Amendment is implicated: (1) under the Katz privacy test when the
government conduct violates a subjective expectation of privacy that
society considers reasonable; 5 2 and (2) under the Jones trespass test when
the government commits a common-law trespass into a person, house,
paper, or effect for the purpose of obtaining information.5 ' Additionally,
the locus of the intrusion makes a difference in the calculus. 54 Finally, as if
it could not get any more difficult, a particular court may or may not
Herein
consider both tests in attempting to resolve a particular situation.
lies some of the initial frustration with Fourth Amendment search
jurisprudence: which test applies and does it make a difference?5 6 Even if
49. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) ("For the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected." (citations omitted)).
50. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (stating that a search occurred
when the "[g]overnment physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining
information").
51. For a brief explanation of the history of the law of searches under the Fourth
Amendment, see J. Bryan Boyd, Arrested Development in Search Law: A Look at Disputed
Consent Through the Lens of Trespass Law in a Post-Jones Fourth Amendment-Have We
Arrivedat DisputedAnalysis?, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 5-15 (2015).
52. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]here is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."').
53. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) ("When 'the Government
obtains information by physically intruding' on persons, houses, papers or effects, 'a
"search" within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment' has 'undoubtedly
occurred."' (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950-51)).
54. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (concluding that there
was no search under the Fourth Amendment even though the government committed a
common-law trespass on what has been called an "open field"). But see Jardines, 133 S. Ct.
at 1414 (concluding that there was a search under the Fourth Amendment when the
government used a trained police dog to sniff the area of the front porch and door, stating
"[b]ut when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals").
55. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 ("The Katz reasonable-expectations test 'has been
added to, not substitutedfor,' the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth
Amendment, and so is unnecessary to consider when the government gains evidence by
physically intruding on constitutionally protected areas." (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 95152)).
56. See Boyd, supra note 51, at 41 ("[W]e may very well have arrived at a place in our
Fourth Amendment understanding where disputed analysis, trespass or privacy, threatens to
cloud an already obscured view of search law.").
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we can nail down a particular analytical framework for an understanding of
the Fourth Amendment, the growing impact of technology on search law
further complicates the matter.57 It is in this confluence of determining
which test to use for what kind of governmental intrusion using what
specific technology that our journey begins. As the Supreme Court had to,
consider whether the government's use of satellite-based GPS monitoring
of sex offenders is a Fourth Amendment search, the road to the Grady
decision undoubtedly revisited the tracking cases of Knotts,5 Karo,5 9 and
Jones.60
The Supreme Court decided the cases of Knotts and Karo in the
post-Katz but pre-Jones era that looked primarily to the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test. The cases both involved the government's use
of beepers, a pre-GPS technology that allowed the government to track a
container from a signal emitted from the beeper.61 In both cases, the
government attached a beeper within a container that the defendants
ultimately obtained.62 Specifically, in the Knotts case, the Court analogized
the tracking of the container, and the vehicle that carried it along the public
highways, to that of police visual surveillance. 6 3 The Court held that the
tracking did not involve a search because an individual does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his public travels. 6 4 In Karo, however,
the Court noted one important distinction from Knotts that affected the
search analysis: whether the monitoring of the beeper revealed any details

57. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) ("Where, as here, the
Government uses a [thermal imaging] device that is not in general public use, to explore
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion,
the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.").
58. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
59. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984).
60. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 946.
61. See, e.g., Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277 ("A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery
operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver. In this
case, a beeper was placed in a five-gallon drum containing chloroform purchased by one of
respondent's codefendants. By monitoring the progress of a car carrying the chloroform
Minnesota law enforcement agents were able to trace the can of chloroform from its place of
purchase in Minneapolis, Minn., to respondent's secluded cabin near Shell Lake, Wis. The
issue presented by the case is whether such use of a beeper violated respondent's rights
secured by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.").
62. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (explaining that in the cases of Knotts and Karo "at the
time the beeper was installed the container belonged to a third party, and it did not come
into possession of the defendant until later").
63. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
64. See id (reasoning "[a] person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another").
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of a home.s Because the "monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a
location not open to visual surveillance" occurred, the Court held the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 6
Thus, the
government's monitoring amounted to a search, and violated the Fourth
Amendment under Katz.6 7
Prior to the Jones decision, the rule gleaned from Knotts and Karo
regarding the monitoring of a suspect was clear: the police may track a
suspect's movement through the use of technology, such as beepers, so
long as there was no reasonable expectation of privacy interest affected.6 8
If there was no reasonable expectation of privacy, then there was no search
under the Fourth Amendment. 69 In other words, if the police action in
tracking a suspect by visual surveillance does not constitute a search, then
the Fourth Amendment is not triggered just because the police use
technology to perform the same function, albeit more efficiently. 70 Then
came Jones.n
Over time, technology for tracking improved, and the government
replaced antiquated beeper tracking with more sophisticated and more
accurate GPS devices. Prior to the Jones decision, the lower courts
consistently upheld the government's use of GPS monitoring of a suspect's
vehicle.72 So when federal and state agents, without the authority of a
65. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) ("In Knotts, the record did not
show that the beeper was monitored while the can containing it was inside the cabin, and we
therefore had no occasion to consider whether a constitutional violation would have
occurred had the fact been otherwise.").
66. Id. ("At the risk of belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which
the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a
warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as
justifiable.").
67. Id.
68. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
69. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
70. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282 ("Visual surveillance from public places along
Petschen's route or adjoining Knotts' premises would have sufficed to reveal all of these
facts to the police. The fact that the officers in this case relied not only on visual
surveillance, but also on the use of the beeper to signal the presence of Petschen's
automobile to the police receiver, does not alter the situation. Nothing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon
them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this
case.").
71. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
72. See United States v. Katzin, 732 F.3d 187, 229 (3d Cir. 2013) (Van Antwerpen, J.,
dissenting) (discussing that prior to Jones there was "a uniform consensus across the federal
courts of appeals to address the issue that the installation and subsequent use of GPS or
GPS-like device was not a search or, at most, was a search but did not require a warrant").
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warrant,7 3 installed a GPS tracking device to a Jeep parked in a public lot
and subsequently tracked the vehicle's movements for approximately
twenty-eight days, the government agents assumed that the Court would
again determine that a "search" had not occurred.74 The government could
not have been more wrong. In a sweeping decision, the Supreme Court
held the installation of the GPS device and subsequent monitoring
constituted a "search" under the Fourth Amendment.
Writing for the
five-Justice majority, 76 Justice Scalia established the Court's holding upon
a trespass-based analysis. 77 The government committed a "search" when it

trespassed on the suspect's private property and installed the GPS device
for the purpose of obtaining information.78
In addressing the previous beeper cases of Knotts and Karo, which
had held that the government activity was not a "search," Justice Scalia
distinguished the prior holdings on three points. 79 First, he asserted the
Court considered the issue of monitoring only in Knotts, and not the issue
80
of installation.
Second, he acknowledged the Court considered
installation in the case of Karo, but maintained the installation in Karo was
fundamentally different since the suspect "accepted the container as it came
to him, beeper and all, and was therefore not entitled to object to the
beeper's presence, even though it was used to monitor the container's
location." 1 The situation in Jones, on the other hand, was distinct in that
he "possessed the Jeep at the time the Government trespassorily inserted
73. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. While the government obtained a warrant allowing for
the installation of the GPS device to the suspect's vehicle within the District of Columbia
and within 10 days of issuance, the agents installed the GPS device on the 1lth day and not
within the District. Id The opinion noted, "The Government has conceded noncompliance
with the warrant and has argued only that a warrant was not required." Id. at 948 n. I (citing
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 566 n.* (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 949 ("We hold that the Government's installation of a GPS device on a
target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a
'search."').
76. While nine Justices concurred in the result that the government's actions amounted
to a "search," there was considerable debate as to the rationale in reaching this conclusion.
Justice Scalia based his majority opinion upon a trespass-based theory, while others reached
the conclusion based upon the privacy test of Katz.
77. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
78. Id.; see also id. at 951 n.5 ("Trespass alone does not qualify, but there must be
conjoined with that what was present here: an attempt to find something or to obtain
information.").
79. Id. at 951-52.
80. Id. at 952 ("Knotts did not challenge that installation, and we specifically declined
to consider its effect on the Fourth Amendment analysis.").
8 1. Id.
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Finally, Justice Scalia
82
the information-gathering device. . .
emphasized the Knotts and Karo Courts considered whether a search
occurred under the Katz test only, and not under a trespass framework.8 3
Since Jones made clear that the government's actions of installing a
GPS device to a suspect's car for the purpose of gathering information was
a "search" under the Fourth Amendment, 84 how would the Court respond to
the government attaching a GPS device to a person for the purpose of
obtaining information? In North Carolina, lawyers for Torrey Dale Grady
prepare to make their case that the answer to this question is SBM
undoubtedly constitutes an unreasonable search.
C.

"Satellite Headlines Read"8 5 : The Case of Torrey Dale Grady

Approximately thirteen months after the completion of his sentence 86
for the crime of taking indecent liberties with a child, Torrey Grady
received a letter from the North Carolina Department of Corrections." As
detailed in the March 12, 2010 letter, the State intended to conduct a
satellite-based monitoring court hearing against Grady based upon the
Department's initial determination that he was a recidivist.89 The letter
revealed Grady's recidivist determination was based upon both his guilty
plea to the 2006 indecent liberties charge 90 above as well as a 1997
second-degree sexual offense charge 91 where he pled no contest and was
sentenced to a term of seventy-two to ninety-six months in prison. 9 2
82. Id.
83. Id. ("But as we have discussed, the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has
been added to, not substitutedfor, the common-law trespassory test. The holding in Knotts
addressed only the former, since the latter was not at issue.").
84. See id at 949.
85. DAVE MATTHEWS BAND, supra note 1.
86. Grady was released from prison on January 25, 2009. See Record on Appeal at 6,
State v. Grady, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 467 (N.C. Ct. App. May 6, 2014) (No. COA13-958).
87. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.1 (2005) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-202.1 (2015)). Specifically, Grady was charged with statutory rape and indecent
liberties with a child. See Brief for the State at 2, Grady, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 467
(No. COAl3-958). The defendant, in his brief, contends that Grady, who was 26 years old
at the time, entered into a sexual relationship with a 15 year old girl, resulting in the birth of
a child. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 4, Grady, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 467
(No. COAl3-958).
88. See Record on Appeal, supra note 86, at 3-4.
89. Id. at 3.
90. Id. at 18-19.
91. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.5A (1997) (repealed 2015, re-codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-27.27 (2015)).
92. See Record on Appeal, supra note 86, at 20-21.
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Further, the letter explained that the satellite-based monitoring
determination hearing was scheduled for April 13, 2010 in New Hanover
Superior Court.93
Despite the notice of the April 2010 hearing, it is not clear whether the
court ever considered Grady's possible enrollment into the monitoring
program at that time.94 Grady, however, was arrested and charged on or
about July 16, 2010, for failing to maintain his address with the State's sex
offender registry. 95 Subsequently, Grady pled guilty to the charge and was
sentenced to twenty-four to twenty-nine months in prison. 9 6 After serving
his sentence, he was released on August 24, 2012.97
On May 9, 2013, Grady's attorney filed a "Motion to Deny
Satellite-Based Monitoring Application and Dismiss Proceeding" in New
Hanover Superior Court.98 In his motion, Grady argued the monitoring was
unconstitutional on several grounds, including that satellite-based
monitoring violated "his rights to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure .. . ."99
Superior Court Judge Reuben Young conducted a
satellite-based monitoring determination hearingloo on May 14, 2013, and
0 Judge Young ruled Grady was a recidivist and
denied Grady's motion.o'
mandated that he be required to enroll in the monitoring program for the
rest of his life.1 02 Grady's counsel gave notice of appeal to the North
Carolina Court of Appeals. 10 3
On appeal, Grady argued lifetime satellite monitoring violated both
the State and Federal Constitutions. 0 4 Grady contended the specific
93. Id. at 3. Additionally, the letter stated, "At this hearing, you will have the
opportunity to contest evidence presented by the State that you are subject to the Satellite
Based Monitoring program." Id.
94. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief, supra note 87, at 4 (stating "the record is unclear
as to whether any hearing occurred on that date").
95. See Record on Appeal, supra note 86, at 6.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 5.
99. Id. at 11.
100. Commonly referred to as a satellite-based monitoring "bring-back" hearing. See
supra Part I-A. In addition, Grady's counsel claimed that the satellite-based monitoring
hearing took a total of 20 minutes. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Grady v. North
Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015) (No. 14-593).
101. See Record on Appeal, supra note 86, at 22.
102. Id
103. Id. at 23.
104. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief, supra note 87, at 5. Specifically, Grady argued
that the monitoring program violates the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable search and seizures. Id. Additionally, he argued the program violates the
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question of whether the constant monitoring of a person violates the Fourth
Amendment as an unreasonable search was of first impression in North
Carolina.105 Relying on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Jones,
which established that a search occurs under a trespass theory when "[t]he
Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information," 1 06 Grady argued the GPS monitoring program was
a "series of trespassory searches" 10 7 into areas enumerated under the Fourth
Amendment.108 In particular, Grady argued the monitoring was an
unconstitutional trespass in three ways: of the "person" in that the State
attached a tracking device to his ankle; of an "effect" when the tracking of
Grady included travel in a car; and of the "house" in that the State
continually tracked defendant where he resided.1 09 The State refused to
address Grady's legal contentions on appeal. Instead, it maintained
Grady's argument had already been considered and rejected by the North
Carolina Court of Appeals in State v. Jones."l0
In State v. Jones,"' decided after the filing of Grady's brief, the Court
of Appeals concluded that the trespass test for a search and the "specific
holding in [United States v.] Jones does not control."ll 2 In particular, the
Court of Appeals explained that since North Carolina's satellite-based
monitoring proceeding is civil in nature, it is "readily distinguishable from
that presented in [UnitedStates v.] Jones.""3

North Carolina Constitution prohibiting general warrants involving searches of "suspected
places without evidence of the act committed." Id. Since both the Court of Appeals and
U.S. Supreme Court decisions focused exclusively on the issue of whether the SBM
program constituted a "search" under the Fourth Amendment, this Article will address this
contention exclusively.
105. Id. at 6. But see State v. Jones, 750 S.E.2d 883, 886 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (rejecting
the defendant's argument "that if affixing a GPS to an individual's vehicle constitutes a
search of the individual, then the arguably more intrusive act of affixing an ankle bracelet to
an individual must constitute a search of the individual as well").
106. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
107. Defendant-Appellant's Brief, supra note 87, at 12.
108. See U.S. Const. amend. IV (noting "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures").
109. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief, supra note 87, at 12-13. Additionally, Grady
argued that the State committed a physical trespass of his home when Department
employees visit his home for inspection of the tracking equipment. Id
110. Brief for the State, supra note 87, at 6-7.
111. State v. Jones, 750 S.E.2d 883 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
112. Id. at 886.
113. Id.
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Considering Grady's appeal, the Court of Appeals wrote an
unpublished opinion,' 14 affirming the trial court.' 15 In rejecting Grady's
appeal, the court unanimously agreed with the State's contention that its
previous decision in State v. Jones controlled.' 16 The court concluded,
"Because State v. Jones was filed after United States v. Jones, we continue
to be bound by State v. Jones.""1 7 As a result of the ruling, Grady filed a
petition for discretionary review in the North Carolina Supreme Court, but
the petition was denied."'
Undeterred, Grady filed a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court.119 It is at this stage that most cases go to die, especially
considering the fact that the Supreme Court receives approximately
7,000-8,000 petitions annually and will only accept approximately 180
each term.1 2 0 The United States Supreme Court, however, granted the
petition and issued a per curiam decision vacating the decisions of the
North Carolina appellate courts.121 How the Court reached its conclusion
and, perhaps more importantly, the questions left open by the Grady
decision force North Carolina and other states to reconsider its sex offender
monitoring statutes in light of reasonableness.
The Court rejected the State's theory that because North Carolina's
satellite-based monitoring program was civil in nature, it was not a Fourth
Specifically, the Court determined the State's
Amendment search.122
reliance upon State v. Jones that suggested the Court's decision in United
States v. Jones was distinguishable because of the civil nature of the
monitoring program to be "inconsistent with this Court's precedents." 2 3
Instead, the Court recited its property-based search decisions of United
States v. Jones1 24 and Floridav. Jardines,12 5 and declared, "in light of these
114. See State v. Grady, No. COA13-958, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 467, at *1 (N.C. Ct.
App. May 6, 2014).
115. Id at *1.
116. Id. at *3-*4 (stating "this Court considered the precise issue on appeal presented by
defendant in the present case").

117. Id.at*6.
118. State v. Grady, 762 S.E.2d 460, 460 (N.C. 2014).
119. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 100, at 1.
120. The Justices' Caseload, SUPREMECOURT.GOv, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/

justicecaseload.aspx [https://perma.cc/5DA3-9HX2] (last visited May 5, 2016). While the
Court will hear approximately eighty cases for oral arguments, the Court will also resolve as
many as 100 additional cases without oral argument.
121. Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) (per curiam).
122. See id at 1371.
123. Id. at 1370.
124. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 ("The Government physically occupied
private property for the purpose of obtaining information.").

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law,

19

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [], Art. 2
170

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:151

decisions, it follows that a State also conducts a search when it attaches a
device to a person's body, without consent, for the purpose of tracking that
individual's movements."1 2 6 In repudiating the North Carolina Court of
Appeals' misplaced understanding of the reach of the Fourth Amendment
to purely criminal matters, 12 7 the Court elucidated, "'it is well settled,'
however, 'that the Fourth Amendment's protection extends beyond the
sphere of criminal investigations,' . . . and the government's purpose in

collecting information does not control whether the method of collection
constitutes a search." 1 2 8 Consistent with its property-based jurisprudence,
the Court concluded a Fourth Amendment search occurred where the
State's GPS monitoring program is a physical intrusion on a person for the
purpose of obtaining information. 12 9
Despite the Court's declaration that the Fourth Amendment was
implicated in satellite-based monitoring, one large question remained
unanswered. The Court noted the "ultimate question" of whether the SBM
program was a reasonable1 3 0 search had not been decided. 1 3 1 Since the
North Carolina courts had not reached the issue of the reasonableness of
the program, the Court declined to reach this issue "in the first instance."1 32
While the Court failed to reach a conclusion on the "ultimate question," it
provided a rubric for the lower courts to follow when assessing
reasonableness: "[t]he reasonableness of a search depends on the totality of
the circumstances, including the nature and purpose of the search and the
extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy
,,133
expectations.

125. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) ("When 'the Government obtains
information by physically intruding' on persons, houses, papers, or effects, 'a "search"
within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment' has 'undoubtedly occurred."'
(quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 n.3)).
126. Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1370.
127. See State v. Jones, 750 S.E.2d 883, 886 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) ("The context
presented in the instant case-which involves a civil SBM proceeding-is readily
distinguishable from that presented in [United States v.] Jones, where the Court considered
the propriety of a search in the context of a motion to suppress evidence.").
128. Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371 (quoting Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 755 (2010)).
129. Id.
130. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (memorializing "the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures").
131. Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371.
132. Id.
133. Id. The Court cited two cases to support its reasonableness framework: Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) and Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 654-56 (1995). Both cases will be addressed in Part II of this Article, infra.
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With the "ultimate question" left unanswered, North Carolina and
states with similar lifetime monitoring programs are left to chart a path to
reasonableness.
The first stop to reasonableness, however, involves
traversing the slippery footholds of the Supreme Court's previous decisions
addressing reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. As the next
section will explain, the road is not so clearly defined.
II.

"THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED"l3: DEFINING REASONABLENESS UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment offers protection from "unreasonable
searches and seizures,"1 3 5 but when it comes to actually defining
reasonableness, the devil is in the details.1 3 6 Are warrants required? If not,
how do we evaluate reasonableness? Indeed, the Supreme Court has
struggled to consistently maintain a clear direction on this topic.137 In its
celebrated decision in Katz, the Court declared, "searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 38 Later, the
Court professed with equal force, "The touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness." 39 The reality is that the state of the law on
this topic suffers from "a mass of contradictions and obscurities that has
ensnared the 'Brethren' in such a way that every effort to extract
themselves only finds them more profoundly stuck." 40 Tread carefully
here.
To make matters worse, the Court draws a distinction between
searches depending on the identifiable interests served: "traditional

134.

GEORGE STRAIT, The Road Less Traveled, on THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED (MCA

Nashville 2001).
135. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
136. See Amar, supra note 47, at 762-63 (noting the debate between the warrant

requirement and reasonableness).
137. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating "our jurisprudence lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical warrant
requirement and looking to reasonableness alone").

138. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
139. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991); see also, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) ("As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the
ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is 'reasonableness."').
140. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1468,

1468 (1985).
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criminal investigation" or "non-criminal law enforcement goals."l 4
Indeed, "the line between a traditional criminal investigation, on the one
hand, and a search or seizure designed primarily to serve non-criminal law
enforcement goals, on the other hand, is thin and, quite arguably,
arbitrary." 4 2 As a result of this distinction, a number of cases and
situations have sprung up to create a classification of warrantless searches
that defies a common and consistent theme.1 43 The only dependable motifs
in these searches appear to be that a warrant is not required and that the
government interests must be balanced against the individual interests to
determine reasonableness.144 And if it could not get any muddier, some of
these non-law enforcement goals searches fall within its own category,
referred to as "special needs" searches.1 45
In the case of the Grady decision, the Supreme Court fails to provide
further illumination on the topic of the reasonableness of GPS monitoring
as a warrantless search. In its sparse opinion, the Court mandated a
balancing of interests to determine if the search was reasonable. 146 The
only guidance the Court offered1 4 7 to the lower courts was a reference to

141. 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
VOLUME 1: INVESTIGATION 293 (6th ed. 2013).
142. Id. ("Yet, it is also a line of considerable constitutional significance.").
143. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004) (searches and
seizures at the international border); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
664-65 (1995) (drug testing of high school athletes); Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (stops of drivers at temporary sobriety checkpoints); Skinner v.
Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-18 (1989) (drug testing of railway employees);
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987) (searches of probationer's home); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985) (searches of students); Camara v. Mun.
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-34 (1967) (home inspections); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d
893, 895-96 (9th Cir. 1973) (searches of airline passengers).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976) ("In
delineating the constitutional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the Court has
weighed the public interest against the Fourth Amendment interest of the individual . . . ."
(citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) and Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968))).
145. See, e.g., Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873 (stating "we have permitted exceptions when
'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable."' (quoting TL.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun,
J., concurring))).
146. See Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) (per curiam) ("The
reasonableness of a search depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature
and purpose of the search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable
privacy expectations.").
147. Id.
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two prior balancing cases: Samsonl48 and Vernonia.149 And while these
cases have virtually nothing in common with one another, there are greater
questions that arise from the opinion's paucity of details. Is the Court
attempting to categorize GPS monitoring as a "special needs" search?
What exactly are "special needs" searches?15 0 Or is the Court seeking a
general reasonableness balancing?' 5 Does it matter?1 5 2
A.

"SpecialNeeds": A Special Problemfor Search Analysis Under the
Fourth Amendment

There has been very little guidance to explain exactly what a "special
needs" search entails, other than it has been recognized as a category of
searches "that has never included searches designed to serve 'the normal
need for law enforcement."" 53 While commentators and scholars have
attempted to create specific and separate categories for certain warrantless
searches (administrative searches, checkpoints, drug testing, etc.) from
"special needs," "there is little or no reason for this distinction." 5 4 In fact,
it has been noted that when it comes to "special needs" searches, "the term
turns out to be no more than a label that indicates when a lax standard will
apply." 55
In one of its most recent opinions summarizing the "special needs"
exception, the Court explained, "Search regimes where no warrant is ever

148. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 857 (2006) (holding a suspicionless search of a
parolee was reasonable).

149. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (holding random
drug testing of student athletes was reasonable).
150. See William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 553, 554 (1992) ("[L]ittle or no effort has been made to
explain what these 'special needs' are .... ).
151. See, e.g., David H. Kaye, Why So Contrived? Fourth Amendment Balancing, Per Se
Rules, and DNA Databases After Maryland v. King, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 535,
553-55 (2014) (noting the "more complex. . . state of affairs" when "the Court uses

balancing to establish Fourth Amendment reasonableness").
152. As noted in Part III-B-2 infra, the Seventh Circuit applied a balancing test to
conclude that Wisconsin's lifetime monitoring statute constituted a reasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment. Judges Posner and Flaum each wrote opinions in favor of this
conclusion. Judge Flaum, in his concurrence, called the search a "special needs" search,
whereas Judge Posner does not use the term "special needs" in his majority opinion. While
both judges reach the same ultimate conclusion, the departure in their categorical analysis is
worth noting in the larger picture of the warrantless searches.

153. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1981 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)).
154. See DRESSLER& MICHAELS, supra note 141, at 307.
155. Stuntz, supra note 150, at 554.
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required may be reasonable where 'special needs . .. make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable,' and where the 'primary
purpose' of the searches is 'distinguishable from the general interest in
crime control."'156 The critical question of whether the search is reasonable
"is determined 'by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it
intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which
it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests."' 57 In
balancing the interests of the government and the individual, the Court has
validated both individualized suspicion15 8 and suspicionlessl 5 9 searches
under the banner of "special needs." In attempting to track how the Court
balances reasonableness, we will look to the two specific instances, cited
by the Grady decision, as helpful: suspicionless drug testing of student
athletes 1 60 and suspicionless searches of parolees.161 Unfortunately, more
questions will remain. Do these cases involve a "special needs" analysis?
Or do the cases offer a more generalized reasonableness balancing
analysis? Or both? If it is unclear, does it make a difference in the Grady
case? The short answers are yes, yes, yes, and maybe.1 6 2
In Vernonia, the Court upheld as reasonable the school district's
program that called for random urinalysis drug testing for all students
participating in athletics programs.163 Specifically citing to the "special
needs" exception,1 6 4 the Court approved the drug-testing program of
suspicionless searches, thus constituting an extension to its previous
decision in T.L.O. 16 5 which required some level of individualized suspicion
for school searches of students.166 In balancing the interests, the Court

156. Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015) (citations omitted).
157. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-119 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
158. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985) (search based upon
"reasonable grounds"); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987) (search based upon
"reasonable grounds").
159. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (suspicionless
search); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (suspicionless
search).
160. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 648.
161. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846 (2006).
162. See Part III-B-2 infra, where the Seventh Circuit appears to apply both tests in
reaching the same result.
163. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65.
164. See id at 653 ("We have found such 'special needs' to exist in the public school
context.").
165. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347-48 (1985).
166. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653 ("The school search we approved in T.L.O., while
not based on probable cause, was based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. As we
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considered the privacy interests of the individual and posited the
importance of the context, including the individual's "legal relationship
with the State," as it related to reasonable expectations.167 The Court
determined the State's "custodial and tutelary responsibility" of students
created a lesser expectation of privacy, especially since the students chose
to participate in athletics.1 6 8 In addition, the Court looked to the privacy
intrusions upon the students in the administration of the drug testing and
stated the procedures used to get the urine samples were "negligible."l 6 9
Lastly, the Court considered the invasion of privacy on the individual as it
related to the amount of information disclosed and concluded the testing
only revealed the presence of drugs, as opposed to other medical
information such as pregnancies or diseases.1 7 0
In weighing the privacy interests of the intrusion, the Court next
examined "the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue
here, and the efficacy of this means for meeting it," and declared deterring
In support of its
drug use by students is an important concern.171
conclusion, the Court cited a number of national studies that warned of the
dangers of drug use in adolescents, and noted the lower court had made
specific findings that the drug problem in Vernonia was a significant factor
in the "epidemic" disciplinary problems in the school district.1 7 2 Finally, in
considering the efficacy of the intrusion on all student athletes without
suspicion, the Court referred to the lower court's findings that athletes were
the "leaders of the drug culture,"'7 3 and maintained "a drug problem largely
fueled by the 'role model' effect of athletes' drug use, and of particular
danger to athletes, is effectively addressed by making sure that athletes do

explicitly acknowledged, however, 'the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible
requirement of such suspicion."' (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8)).
167. See id at 654 ("What expectations are legitimate varies, of course, with context,
depending, for example, upon whether the individual asserting the privacy interest is at
home, at work, in a car, or in a public park." (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338)).
168. See id at 656-57 ("Somewhat like adults who choose to participate in a 'closely
regulated industry,' students who voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to
expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy." (citing Skinner v.
Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989) and United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S.
311, 316 (1972))).
169. See id. at 658 (noting that the drug testing procedures "are nearly identical to those
typically encountered in public restrooms, which men, women, and especially
schoolchildren use daily").
170. See id
171. Id at 660-61 ("That the nature of the concern is important-indeed, perhaps
compelling-can hardly be doubted.").
172. See id at 662-63.
173. See id. at 649.
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not use drugs."1 74 In its final analysis, the Court found that the
governmental interests weighed in favor of upholding the search in
Vernonia as reasonable.175 While Vernonia represented a relatively clear,
albeit expansive view of the "special needs" search doctrine, the case of
Samsonl76 is a mystery as it relates to reasonableness balancing.
Like Vernonia, the Samson Court considered and balanced the
interests affected, 77 but this is where the comparison stops. At the outset,
the Samson Court explicitly declined to resolve the case as a "special
needs" search.178 Alternatively, the Court couched its reasoning in "general
Fourth Amendment principles." 1 7 9 Instead of identifying a need beyond
law enforcement as in the case of "special needs," the Court pivoted to a
totality of the circumstances balancing of interests test.180 In balancing the
interests, the Court confronted a question left open in its previous decision
in United States v. Knights:'8 ' "whether a condition of release can so
diminish or eliminate a released prisoner's reasonable expectation of
privacy that a suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer would not
offend the Fourth Amendment."' 82 The Court ruled the suspicionless
search of a parolee, based solely on his status as a parolee, was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.' 8 3
In balancing the individual privacy interests, the Court declared that
parolees have "severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of
their status alone."' 8 4 The Court explained that reasonable expectations of
174. Id. at 663. In addressing the respondent's concerns that there was a "less intrusive
means" to satisfy the governmental interest, the Court stated, "We have repeatedly refused
to declare that only the 'least intrusive' search practicable can be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment." Id.
175. Id. at 664-65.
176. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 849 (2006).
177. See id. at 848 ("Whether a search is reasonable 'is determined by assessing, on the
one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests."'
(quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001))).
178. See id at 853 n.3 ("Nor do we address whether California's parole search condition
is justified as a special need under Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), because our
holding under general Fourth Amendment principles renders such an examination
unnecessary."); see also id. at 858 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Not surprisingly, the majority
does not seek to justify the search of petitioner on 'special needs' grounds.").
179. Id. at 853 n.3.
180. Id. at 848.
181. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (upholding a warrantless search, based upon reasonable
suspicion, of a probationer's apartment as reasonable).
182. Samson, 547 U.S. at 847.
183. See id.
184. Id. at 852.
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privacy for individuals could be placed on a spectrum of diminishing
privacy considerations from the ordinary "law-abiding" citizen, who enjoys
"absolute liberty,"' 85 to the prisoner, who has no expectation of privacy.1 8 6
Justifying the suspicionless search of parolees in Samson based on the
reasonable suspicion search of a probationer in Knights, the Court
elucidated that parole, like the situation in Samson, "is more akin to
imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment."' 87
The governmental interests, on the other hand, in reducing recidivism
were "substantial." 8 8
The Court noted that it has "repeatedly
acknowledged that a State has an 'overwhelming interest' in supervising
parolees because 'parolees . . . are more likely to commit future criminal

offenses."' 89 In addition to recidivism concerns, the Court has recognized
the government's interest in "promoting reintegration and positive
citizenship" of those who have been convicted and conceded that privacy
intrusions to achieve these goals are acceptable.1 90 To support the
"substantial" government interests, the Court cited to empirical evidence
that parolees have a 68-70% rate of recidivism. 19' Concluding "the Fourth
Amendment does not render the States powerless to address these concerns
effectively," the Court declared the ability to conduct suspicionless searches
of parolees properly served the governmental interests of reducing
recidivism and promoting reintegration.' 92
The Samson decision, much like Vernonia, marked a dramatic
extension of the government's ability to conduct reasonable searches under
the Fourth Amendment.1 93 These two cases, however, highlight the

185. See id. at 848-49 (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 119).
186. Id. at 848 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984)).
187. Id. at 850.
188. See id. at 853.
189. Id. (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998)).
190. Id. ("Similarly, this Court has repeatedly acknowledged that a State's interests in
reducing recidivism and thereby promoting reintegration and positive citizenship among
probationers and parolees warrant privacy intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated
under the Fourth Amendment." (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868, 879 (1987) and
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001))).
191. Id. The Court also noted that as many as 70% of state parolees in California
reoffend within eighteen months. Id. at 854.
192. See id. at 854. The Court went on to note that requiring individualized suspicion of
parolees would "undermine the State's ability to effectively supervise parolees and protect
the public from criminal acts by reoffenders." Id.
193. See id. at 855 n.4 ("The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not
individualized suspicion.").
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problem of creating rules for justifying warrantless searches. 194 In
particular, we are faced with two familiar, yet different approaches to
reasonableness to consider in light of the Court's guidance from Grady.
But before applying these rules to lifetime monitoring, it is worth noting
the Court's recent decisions involving technology searches in an effort to
understand the privacy concerns at stake in Grady.
B.

Of GPS, Cell Phones, and DNA: The Impact of Technology on Privacy
and Reasonableness

While not cited in the Grady opinion, recent Supreme Court decisions
addressing the concerns surrounding technology and privacy warrant
thoughtful contemplation. In fact, over the last four years, the weight of
modem technology has been examined in three notable cases: United States
v. Jones,'9 5 Riley v. California,19 6 and Marylandv. King. 19 7 The analysesas well as the admonitions-from these cases are essential in framing the
issue of lifetime monitoring as it relates to reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment.
First, in the most directly applicable case to the Grady decision, Jones
offered a view of the concerns over GPS monitoring, when it held that the
installation of a GPS device on the suspect's vehicle and monitoring
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.' 9 8 In addition to the
holding, there was a substantial amount of discussion regarding the length
While the Jones decision considered the
of monitoring.1 99
194. See Bradley, supra note 140, at 1473-75 (explaining that "[t]here are over twenty
exceptions to the probable cause or the warrant requirement or both" and that "[t]he reason
that all of these exceptions have grown up is simple: the clear rule that warrants are required
is unworkable and to enforce it would lead to exclusion of evidence in many cases where the
police activity was essentially reasonable").
195. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
196. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
197. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
198. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. For a thorough discussion of the Jones decision as it
relates to search law, see supra Part I-B.
199. See id. at 954. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority noted,
The concurrence posits that "relatively short-term monitoring of a person's
movements on public streets" is okay, but that "the use of longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses" is no good. That introduces yet
another novelty into our jurisprudence. There is no precedent for the proposition
that whether a search has occurred depends on the nature of the crime being
investigated. And even accepting that novelty, it remains unexplained why a
4-week investigation is "surely" too long and why a drug-trafficking conspiracy
involving substantial amounts of cash and narcotics is not an "extraordinary
offens[e]" which may permit longer observation. What of a 2-day monitoring of a
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twenty-eight-day monitoring of a suspect's vehicle movements, when faced
with the possibility of long-term, or in the case of Grady, lifetime
monitoring of an individual, would the Court conclude such monitoring to
be reasonable? For now, the answer remains to be seen. In addition to the
length of monitoring, Justice Sotomayor, in her Jones concurrence, warned
200
of the dangers of GPS monitoring.
In particular, Justice Sotomayor
of GPS monitoring in that it
effect
chilling
expounded on the potential
"generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person's public
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political,
Given Justice
professional, religious, and sexual associations."2 01
information
of
kinds
the
of
intrusiveness
the
Sotomayor's concern of
collected from automobile surveillance, how much more is at stake with
GPS monitoring of individuals? For life?
Although the Riley2 02 decision is not entirely germane to this Article,
the Court's discussion of the prevalence of technology and its impact on a
citizen's privacy-familiar concerns echoed from Jones-is worth
noting.203 In Riley, the Court held that "officers must generally secure a
20 4
warrant before conducting" searches of data of an arrestee's cell phone.
In requiring a warrant for a search, the Court justified its holding by

suspected purveyor of stolen electronics? Or of a 6-month monitoring of a
suspected terrorist?
Id. (quoting id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring)).
200. See id. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
201. Id. Justice Sotomayor further explained,
The net result is that GPS monitoring-by making available at a relatively low
cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom
the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track-may "alter the
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to
democratic society."
Id. at 956 (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011)
(Flaum, J., concurring)).
202. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
203. In addition to the technology discussion, it is worth noting that in reaching its
conclusion, the Court noted a general balancing of interests test, similar to that employed in
Vernonia and Samson, and stated,
Absent more precise guidance from the founding era, we generally determine
whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement "by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's
privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests."
Id. at 2484 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
204. Id. at 2485 ("We therefore decline to extend Robinson to searches of data on cell
phones, and hold instead that officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting
such a search.").
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pointing to the enormous amounts of data and other personal information
that can be obtained in a cell phone.20 5 In addition to the quantity of
personal data at risk in a warrantless search, the Court opined the quality of
data obtained was significant. 20 6 Specifically, the Court noted cell phone
data can reveal location information and explicated, "Historic location
information is a standard feature on many smart phones and can reconstruct
someone's specific movements down to the minute, not only around town
but also within a particular building." 2 07
Considering the privacy concerns of exposed cell phone data upon
arrestees, who the Court acknowledged had a diminished expectation of
privacy, the Court declared that warrants are generally required.208 The
balance tipped in favor of individual privacy. As for the government's
interest in warrantless searches, the Court insisted, "Privacy comes at a
cost."209 Again, the Court has expressed a concern in the warrantless
monitoring of individuals, first by GPS monitoring in Jones, now the
potential monitoring of citizens through their cell phone data. Would the
same Court express the same concerns in the case of GPS monitoring of
sex offenders? To be continued.
Finally, it is profoundly curious why the Grady opinion did not cite its
earlier decision of Maryland v. King.210 In King, the Court concluded the
suspicionless DNA identification of arrestees was a reasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment. 2 11 And while the holding itself sheds little
illumination upon the issue raised in this Article, its noticeable absence
from the Grady decision's list of cases gives pause. The Court, in reaching
its conclusion in King, identified two separate examinations to
reasonableness: "special needs," 2 12 and a general balancing of interests

205. Id. at 2489 ("The sum of an individual's private life can be reconstructed through a
thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions .... .").
206. Id. at 2490.
207. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring)).
208. See id. at 2488-89.
209. Id. at 2493.
210. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
211. Id at 1980 ("When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for
a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking

and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee's DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing,
a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.").
212. Id. at 1969 ("In some circumstances, such as '[w]hen faced with special law
enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the
Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless

search or seizure reasonable."' (quoting Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001))).
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based upon diminished expectation of privacy 2 1 3-the very same lines of
analysis raised in Vernonia and Samson.214 In fact, King seems to blend the
two decisions together in its reasonableness inquiry. The King Court
repeated the themes of "context" and "legal relationship with the State" in
its balancing analysis, prominently displayed in its opinion of Vernonia.2 1 5
Additionally, the Court noted the "reduced expectation of privacy," a topic
of significance in Samson, to support the minimal governmental intrusion
in DNA collection of arrestees.216
Ultimately, the Court chose its rationale for reasonableness and
concluded, "The special needs cases, though in full accord with the result
reached here, do not have a direct bearing on the issues presented in this
case, because unlike the search of a citizen who has not been suspected of a
wrong, a detainee has a reduced expectation of privacy." 2 17 In balancing
the interests, the Court determined the privacy interests were outweighed
by the legitimate governmental interest in identification of the arrestee. 2 18
Despite concluding the privacy interest did not tip the scale against
reasonableness, the Court acknowledged the potential concern with DNA
technology and the amount of information obtained and used by the
government. 2 19 The Court noted safeguards were in place such that the

213. Id. at 1978 ("The special needs cases, though in full accord with the result reached
here, do not have a direct bearing on the issues presented in this case, because unlike the
search of a citizen who has not been suspected of a wrong, a detainee has a reduced
expectation of privacy.").
214. See supra Part II-A for a more detailed discussion of the examinations of
reasonableness employed by the Court in Vernonia and Samson.
215. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1977-78.
216. Id. at 1969, 1978-79.
217. Id. at 1978. But see id at 1981-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia scoffed at
the conclusion that "special needs" cases were in "full accord." Id. He stated, "Even the
common name for suspicionless searches-'special needs' searches-itself reflects that they
must be justified, always, by concerns 'other than crime detection."' Id. at 1981. Later,
Justice Scalia quipped, "[B]oth the legitimacy of the Court's method and the correctness of
its outcome hinge entirely on the truth of a single proposition: that the primary purpose of
these DNA searches is something other than simply discovering evidence of criminal
wrongdoing. As I detail below, that proposition is wrong." Id. at 1982.
218. Id. at 1977 (majority opinion) ("In sum, there can be little reason to question 'the
legitimate interest of the government in knowing for an absolute certainty the identity of the
person arrested, in knowing whether he is wanted elsewhere, and in ensuring his
identification in the event he flees prosecution."' (quoting 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.3(c), at 216 (5th ed. 2012)).
219. Id. at 1979.
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DNA testing in King was limited to identification, and referenced the drug
testing safeguards in Vernonia as a parallel situation.22 0
In order to assess whether lifetime satellite-based monitoring of sex
offenders is reasonable, lower courts are left with a choice in their analyses:
apply a "special needs" test, or apply a general reasonableness balancing
approach, paying close attention to context-specific circumstances. While
both are similar, if not identical in many respects, the Supreme Court's lack
of clarity on these types of situations will, no doubt, confuse and bewilder
those who are forced to travel down the road to reasonableness.
III. "THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD" 221 :

DETERMINING THE

REASONABLENESS OF LIFETIME MONITORING AFTER GRADY V. NORTH
CAROLINA 222

Since the Grady decision, lower courts are attempting to answer the
"ultimate question" left open by the Court 22 3: whether satellite-based
monitoring programs are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. While
the original litigants in Grady have both conceded a remand is essential in
order to develop the factual record necessary to assess reasonableness
under North Carolina law as applied to Torrey Grady, 2 24 two states have
attempted to resolve reasonableness with respect to their satellite-based
monitoring statutes. 2 2 5 These decisions mark the first opportunity to track
reasonableness post-Grady, and indeed, the outcomes of these cases may
provide insights to the ultimate question in North Carolina.

220. Id The Court left open, however, the possibility of "additional privacy concerns
not present here" of DNA testing, such as genetic screening. Id. at 1979.
221. THE BEATLES, The Long and Winding Road, on LET IT BE (Apple 1970).

222. Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015) (per curiam).
223. Id at 1371.
224. See Appellant's Motion to Remand to Superior Court and to Stay the Order
Imposing Satellite-Based Monitoring at 4, State v. Grady, COAl3-958 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct.
23, 2015) (stating that "no facts were introduced with respect to the question of
reasonableness" at Grady's initial satellite-based monitoring hearing); see also State's
Response to Defendant's Motion to Remand to Superior Court and to Stay the Order
Imposing Satellite-Based Monitoring at 2, State v. Grady, COAl3-958 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct.
29, 2015) (stating "the State agrees with Defendant that, in order to discern the 'totality of
the circumstances,' facts will need to be developed about the SBM program and about
Defendant himself and, therefore, remand is required").
225. See People v. Hallak, 873 N.W.2d 811, 818-26 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015), rev'd on
other grounds, 876 N.W.2d 523 (Mich. 2016) (mem.); Belleau v. Wall, No. 12-CV-1198,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125909, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 21, 2015), rev'd, 811 F.3d 929 (7th
Cir. 2016).
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The Michigan Lifetime Electronic Monitoring ofKassem Hallak Is a
Reasonable Search22 6

Dr. Kassem Hallak was convicted of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC II).227 In addition to an active prison sentence, as a
consequence of a conviction of a CSC II crime, Michigan law mandates
"the court shall sentence the defendant to lifetime electronic
monitoring ... if the violation involved sexual contact committed by an
individual 17 years of age or older against an individual less than 13 years
Since Hallak's conviction under CSC II involved the
of age." 22 8
inappropriate touching of a twelve-year-old patient, the trial court ordered
lifetime electronic monitoring.22 9 On appeal, Hallak cited the Supreme
Court's decision in Jones,2 30 and argued that lifetime monitoring
constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.23 1
The Michigan Court of Appeals, in the nation's first reported decision
to utilize a reasonableness inquiry to satellite-based monitoring since
Grady, unanimously held that the lifetime electronic monitoring of Hallak
was a reasonable search.232 The court reached its decision by administering
a traditional balancing of interests test, including "the need to search, in the

226. Hallak, 873 N.W.2d at 825.
227. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520c(1)(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2015) ("A
person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree if the person engages in
sexual contact with another person and if any of the following circumstances exists: (a) That
other person is under 13 years of age."). In the same trial of his second-degree criminal
sexual conduct conviction above, Hallak was convicted of seven other counts of criminal

sexual conduct of varying degrees. See Hallak, 873 N.W.2d at 815-16. Hallak, however,
sought appellate review on the second-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction. See id. at

815.
228. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN § 750.520c(2)(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2015); see also
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN § 750.520n(l) (West 2004 & Supp. 2015) ("A person convicted
under section 520b or 520c for criminal sexual conduct committed by an individual 17 years

old or older against an individual less than 13 years of age shall be sentenced to lifetime
electronic monitoring ....

).

229. Hallak, 873 N.W.2d at 816.
230. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012).
231. Hallak, 873 N.W.2d at 824. In addition, Hallak asserted that lifetime monitoring
violated state and federal constitutional provisions against cruel and unusual punishment

and double jeopardy.

Id. at 815.

The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected all of his

arguments on appeal. Id. Germane to this Article, however, was his Fourth Amendment
assertion that lifetime monitoring constituted an unreasonable search.

232. Id. at 825.
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public interest, for evidence of criminal activity against invasion of the
individual's privacy." 233
In its assessment of the public interests, the court proclaimed, "it is
evident that in enacting this monitoring provision, the Legislature was
seeking to provide a way in which to both punish and deter convicted child
sex offenders and to protect society from a group known well for a high
recidivism rate. ,,234 The court explained its articulation of the public
interest by analyzing each of the interests: punishment, deterrence, and
protection of the public from recidivists.23 5
At the outset, the court made clear that a significant purpose behind
lifetime monitoring is to punish those individuals convicted of CSC II
offenses.236 It recognized the particular crime connected to the electronic
monitoring involved sexual conduct by a defendant age seventeen or older
against victims under the age of thirteen. 2 37 The court then connected the
punishment interest to both deterrence and protection when it maintained,
"the Legislature was addressing punishment, deterrence, and the protection
of some of the most vulnerable in our society against some of the worst
crimes known." 238
Additionally, the court established lifetime monitoring serves to deter
offenders from harming the public. 239 It noted, "As the prosecution points
out, electronic monitoring not only acts as a strong deterrent, but also
assists law enforcement efforts to ensure that these individuals, who have
committed 'the most egregious and despicable of societal and criminal
offenses,' do not frequent prohibited areas (elementary schools, etc.) and
remain compliant" with sex offender registration.240
Finally, to support its determination that sex offenders are known to
have a high recidivism rate, the court provided no specific evidence of
recidivism among sex offenders. 241 Instead, the court provided citations to
the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Samson242 and Smith2 43 that
acknowledged a general governmental interest in "reducing recidivism," 244
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. (quoting People v. Chowdhury, 775 N.W.2d 845, 851 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009)).
Id.
Id.
Id
Id. at 826.
Id.
Id
Id. (quoting United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1289 (11th Cir. 2014)).
Id. at 825.
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
Samson, 547 U.S. at 853.
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and the "grave safety concerns that attend recidivism." 2 4 5 Ultimately, the
court concluded, "The 'need to prevent the individual offender from
causing further injury to society' is a valid consideration in designing a
punishment .... " 2 4 6
Turning its attention to the privacy interests of the defendant, the court
noted the diminished expectation of privacy of parolees and probationers,
established in Supreme Court precedents, 247 and concluded "parolees and
probationers have a lower expectation of privacy, even in the comfort of
their own homes, than does the average law-abiding citizen." 2 4 8 In
addition, the court acknowledged that the monitoring "does not prohibit
defendant from traveling, working, or otherwise enjoying the ability to
legally move about as he wishes." 24 9 Lastly, although the satellite
monitoring of defendant is for life, the court presumed the Michigan
Legislature "provided shorter prison sentences for these [CSC IL]
convictions because of the availability of lifetime monitoring." 250
In balancing the interests, the court conceded the "monitoring of a
[law-abiding] citizen would be unreasonable . . . ."2 51 However, since the
monitoring is of a defendant convicted of a serious sex offense, the court
concluded "on balance the strong public interest in the benefit of
monitoring those convicted of [CSC II] against a child under the age of 13
outweighs any minimal impact of defendant's reduced privacy interest." 25 2
For almost four months, the Hallak decision represented the only reported
application of a reasonableness test to electronic monitoring post-Grady.
Then, both a federal district court in Wisconsin and the Seventh Circuit
weighed in,253 further complicating the calculus.

245. Id. at 854.
246. Hallak, 873 N.W.2d at 823-24 (quoting People v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827, 833
(Mich. 1972)).
247. See Samson, 547 U.S. 843, 848-52; United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121
(2001); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984).
248. Hallak, 873 N.W.2d at 826.
249. Id.
250. Id. The court went on to explain "we also cannot forget that minor victims of [CSC
II] are often harmed for life."
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Belleau v. Wall, No. 12-CV- 198, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125909 (E.D. Wis. Sept.
21, 2015), rev'd, 811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016).
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The Wisconsin Lifetime Electronic Monitoringof Michael Belleau Is a
Reasonable Search25 4

Michael Belleau was convicted of second-degree sexual assault of a
child in 1992 and later convicted of first-degree sexual assault of another
child in 1994.255 As a result of his second conviction, Belleau received a
256
Prior to the end of his sentence, Wisconsin
ten-year prison sentence.
filed a petition seeking to civilly commit Belleau as a "sexually violent
person" under Chapter 980257 of the Wisconsin General Statutes. 258 In
2004, a jury determined that Belleau was a sexually violent person under
Chapter 980 and he was civilly committed. 2 59 Belleau remained in a secure
treatment facility until 20 10.260 A treating psychologist examined Belleau
and concluded that he was not at that time "more likely than not to commit
a sexually violent act if he were released," and that he no longer met the
requirements for civil commitment under Chapter 980.261
During the period of time Belleau was civilly committed, however,
Wisconsin enacted a law in 2006 that required lifetime GPS tracking for

254. Belleau, 811 F.3d at 937.
255. Belleau, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125909, at *2-3. Belleau's first conviction
resulted in being placed on probation for five years, including spending one year in jail and
agreeing to be placed under treatment. Id. at *3.
256. Id. at *3. Belleau was paroled in 2000, but his parole was revoked and he returned
to prison in 2001, see id., "after he admitted that he had had sexual fantasies about two girls,
one four years old and the other five, and that he had 'groomed' them for sexual activities
and would have molested them had he had an opportunity to do so." Belleau, 811 F.3d at
931.
257. See Wis. STAT. ANN § 980.01(7) (West 2007) ("'Sexually violent person' means a
person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated
delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty of or not responsible
for a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity or mental disease, defect, or illness, and
who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it likely that
the person will engage in one or more acts of sexual violence."); see also Wis. STAT. ANN.

§ 980.02 (West 2007) (describing the sexually violent person petition and filling process).
258. Belleau, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125909, at *3.
259. Id at *4; see -also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.06 (West 2007) ("If a court or jury
determines that the person who is the subject of a petition under s. 980.02 is a sexually
violent person, the court shall order the person to be committed to the custody of the
department for control, care and treatment until such time as the person is no longer a

sexually violent person. A commitment order under this section shall specify that the
person be placed in institutional care.").

260. Belleau, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125909, at *10.
261. Id at *7-8. Based upon the psychiatric evaluation, Wisconsin "stipulated that it
could not prove that Belleau was a sexually dangerous person, and on July 2, 2010, the
Circuit Court of Brown County entered an order discharging Belleau from his Chapter 980
commitment. . . ." Id. at *8.
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262

Pertinent to Belleau, the statute provided "the
certain sex offenders.
department shall maintain lifetime tracking of a person if any of the
following occurs with respect to the person on or after January 1,
2008: .... A court discharges the person under Section 980.09(4)."263
Since Belleau was to be discharged from his civil commitment by a
court order under section 980.09(4),264 the State sought to impose the
However, Belleau was released from
lifetime GPS monitoring.265
commitment before the State arrived to attach the GPS monitoring
equipment. 26 6 Later that same day, Department of Corrections agents
found Belleau at a nearby bus stop, took him back to the jail where he was
processed out of confinement, and attached a GPS tracking device to his
Belleau filed a lawsuit against Department of Corrections
leg. 26 7
administrators, arguing Wisconsin's lifetime GPS monitoring violated the
state and federal constitution as an unreasonable search.2 68 In the three
judicial opinions that followed Belleau's lawsuit, we get a unique
perspective of the divergent paths of the reasonableness inquiry.
i.

"Someone's Secrets You've Seen "269 : The District CourtHolds
the Lifetime MonitoringofBelleau Is an UnreasonableSearch

In a sweeping proclamation, Federal District Court Judge Griesbach of
the Eastern District of Wisconsin ruled, "the [Fourth Amendment] does not
permit such surveillance absent a warrant issued upon a showing of
probable or special circumstances not present here." 270 In addressing the
rationale for the court's conclusion, Judge Griesbach investigated three

262. Id.; see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 301.48 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
263. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 301.48(2)(b)(2) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
264. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.09(4) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015) ("If the court or jury is
satisfied that the state has not met its burden of proof under sub. (3) [that the person is not
likely a sexually violent person], the person shall be discharged from the custody of the
department.").
265. Belleau, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125909, at *10.
266. Id.
267. Id. The District Court opinion noted that the Department of Corrections agents
were acting solely on the authority of the lifetime GPS monitoring statute and without a
warrant or a court order. Id.
268. Id. at *2. In addition, the defendant argued that lifetime monitoring violated the Ex
Post Facto and Equal Protection Clauses. Id. Pertinent to this Article, however, is the sole
issue of whether Wisconsin's lifetime monitoring violated Belleau's right to be free from
unreasonable searches.
269. DAVE MATTHEWS BAND, supra note 1.
270. Belleau, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125909, at *65.
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separate grounds: 2 7 1 a direct application of the Jones rule to Belleau's
monitoring,272 an evaluation of the lifetime monitoring to the "special
needs" exception, 27 3 and an examination under a traditional reasonableness
balancing test that weighed the public interest against Belleau's privacy. 274
First, the court applied the GPS monitoring of Belleau to the Supreme
Court's decision in Jones275 and determined, "if Jones controls the issue,
application of [s]ection 301.48 to Belleau violates his rights under the
Fourth Amendment." 27 6 Judge Griesbach compared Jones, where the
Supreme Court was concerned by the government's placing of a GPS
tracking device on a suspect's car for a period of twenty-eight days of
monitoring without a warrant, 2 7 7 to Wisconsin's attaching of a GPS device
to Belleau and noted that in the instant case, the government sought to
monitor for life.278 In addition, unlike in Jones where the monitoring of the
vehicle occurred on public roads,2 79 the court distinguished the ability of
the government to monitor Belleau "throughout the State, all without a
warrant."280 Lastly, the court noted an important difference between the
Jones case and Belleau in that the government in Jones had probable cause
to suspect that the defendant was engaged in criminal activities. 28 1 In stark
contrast to Jones, however, Judge Griesbach made clear the State conceded
it lacked probable cause to suspect that Belleau committed a crime.2 82
Rather, Wisconsin claimed it could attach the device because Belleau may
commit a future crime.283 Despite the application to Jones, the court did
not hold that Jones controlled.2 84 Instead of answering the question
definitively, it continued its analysis based upon another legal theory:
special needs.285

271. Note that there is some dispute as to whether there is indeed a separate analysis
between a "special needs" search and traditional reasonableness balancing. See infra Part
IV.
272. Belleau, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125909, at *51-52.
273. Id at *53, *63.
274. Id at *53-64.
275. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012).
276. Belleau, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125909, at *52.
277. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
278. Belleau, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125909, at *51-52.
279. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
280. Belleau, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125909, at *52.
281. Id.; see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
282. Belleau, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125909, at *52.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at *53.
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Second, the court considered the State's position that lifetime GPS
monitoring is a reasonable search under the "special needs" exception. 2 86
Specifically, the State asserted the "special needs" of Belleau's lifetime
monitoring included reducing recidivism.

287

Further, the State maintained,

crimes "like Belleau's are uniquely harmful to society because they involve
children, and his untreated mental condition is one that elevates the risk to
reoffend."288 In response to the State's claims, the court recognized "the
importance of protecting children from sexual assault [and] the devastating
effects of such crimes."2 89 Judge Griesbach refused, however, to extend the
"special needs" exception to the case. 2 9 0 While noting the "special needs"
exception is not utilized in situations "'where governmental authorities
primarily pursue their general crime control ends,"' 2 9 1 the court concluded
the articulated purposes of lifetime monitoring in its "[p]rotection of the
public, deterrence, and assisting in the investigation of crime clearly
constitute crime control ends."292 Although the court concluded the State
failed to satisfy a "special needs" exception in this case, it continued its
analysis with a balancing of interests of GPS monitoring.2 93
The court considered the "more general question" 294 of reasonableness
by balancing the "individual privacy interests at stake against the needs of
the public." 2 95 Having recognized the public interest in the protection of
society from recidivist sex offenders, the court focused on Belleau's
296
In his initial evaluation, Judge Greisbach considered
privacy interests.
whether Belleau had a diminished expectation of privacy.297 Examining the
Supreme Court cases of Samson2 9 8 and Vernonia,29 9 the court distinguished
286. Id; see, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 ("[W]e have permitted
exceptions when 'special needs, beyond normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
and probable-cause requirement impracticable."' (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 351 (1985))); see supra Part Il-A (discussing the special needs exception).
287. Belleau, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125909, at *63-64.
288. Id.
289. Id. at *64.
290. Id.
291. Id. (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43 (2000)).
292. Id.
293. Id. at *64-65.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at *21.
297. Id.
298. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 857 (2006) (upholding the warrantless and
suspicionless search of a parolee as a reasonable search).
299. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (upholding the
random and suspicionless drug testing of student athletes as a reasonable search).
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the defendant's privacy interest and stated, "Belleau's expectation of
privacy is not diminished by the fact that he continues to serve a sentence
for a crime or by the fact that he is a child 'committed to the temporary
custody of the State as schoolmaster."' 300 Instead, Belleau "completed the
sentences imposed for his crimes more than ten years ago, and his civil
commitment to the custody of the State as a sexually violent person was
terminated more than five years ago." 30 1 While the court conceded that
"even after a person convicted of a felony has completed his sentence, he
remains subject to certain prohibitions," it proclaimed, "No court has held
that a person who has fully served his sentence for a crime3 0 has
a
2
diminished expectation of privacy by virtue of his prior conviction.,,
Continuing its appraisal of the privacy interests, the court turned to the
duration and extent of the intrusion and determined the intrusion upon
Belleau's privacy is greater than experienced in Samson or Vernonia.303
Instead of agreeing to the monitoring as a condition of release, as was the
case in Samson,3 04 or consenting to periodic drug test to participate in
school sports as in Vernonia,305 Belleau was forced to wear a GPS device
for life without any meaningful choice.30 6 In its final calculus, the court
resolved that the intrusion upon Belleau was substantial and ultimately
concluded that the lifetime GPS monitoring of an individual who has
already served his sentence 30 7 is unreasonable, absent a warrant or special
circumstances.30 s With the court's pronouncement, Michael Belleau's
lifetime electronic monitoring was unconstitutional,30 9 until the Seventh
Circuit weighed in on the reasonableness inquiry. 3 10

300. Belleau, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125909, at *60 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at
654).
301. Id.
302. Id at *60-61.
303. Id. at *61.
304. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846 (2006).
305. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650 (1995).
306. Belleau, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125909, at *61, ("Belleau, in contrast, has been
forced to wear a GPS tracking device strapped to his ankle constantly for the rest of his life
under a threat of prison if he cuts it off. He has no say in the matter and was presented with
no options.").
307. Id at *64-65. The court noted "that this would not prevent the State from
compelling a person convicted of sexual assault to lifetime GPS tracking as punishment for
a crime." Id. In this situation, however, the court stated, "Unfortunately, the law at the time
Belleau committed his crimes did not permit such a sentence." Id. at *65.
308. Id
309. Id
310. Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016).
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"Everything GoodNeeds Replacing"311. The Seventh Circuit
Holds the Lifetime Monitoring ofBelleau Is a Reasonable Search

On appeal, a panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
unanimously reversed the lower court's decision, and concluded that
Wisconsin's lifetime monitoring of Belleau was reasonable. 3 12 Writing for
the court, Judge Posner noted, "Although the judge wrote a long opinion, it
omits what seem to us the crucial considerations in favor of the
constitutionality of Wisconsin's requiring the plaintiff to wear the ankle
bracelet for the rest of his life." 3 13 In addition to Judge Posner's opinion,
Judge Flaum included a separate concurrence on the judgment.3 14 While
both judges reached the same answer to the "ultimate question" of
reasonableness left open by the Supreme Court's decision in Grady,1 5 each
opinion left unique contours for consideration as the North Carolina courts
will attempt to track the reasonableness of GPS monitoring.
In his majority opinion, Judge Posner did not address "special needs"
Instead, he articulated a balancing of interests test and
searches. 1
concluded:
Given how slight is the incremental loss of privacy from having to wear the
anklet monitor, and how valuable to society (including sex offenders who
have gone straight) the information collected by the monitor is, we can't
agree with the district judge that the Wisconsin law violates the Fourth
Amendment. 3 17

In his assessment of the societal interests the law serves to protect against
the intrusion concerns from the individual, Judge Posner noted, "The test is
318
reasonableness, not satisfying a magistrate."
Turning to the governmental interests in lifetime monitoring, Judge
Posner focused his analysis in the case to two key points: the nature of the
crimes Belleau committed, and the likelihood of recidivism in the future. 3 19

311.

DAVE MATTHEWS BAND, supra note 1.

312. Belleau, 811 F.3d at 937. The court also ruled that Wisconsin's lifetime monitoring
of Belleau did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. The scope of this Article does not
embrace this issue.

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id. at 931.
Id. at 938-44 (Flaum, J., concurring).
See Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1368 (2015) (per curiam).
See generally Belleau, 811 F.3d at 930-38 (majority opinion).
Id. at 936.

318. Id.; see also id. at 932 (stating that the Fourth Amendment "requires that searches
be reasonable but does not require a warrant or other formality designed to balance
investigative need against a desire for privacy; the only reference to warrants is a prohibition
of general warrants").

319. Id. at 932-35.
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In particular, Judge Posner linked the past crimes, sexual assault of
children, to the predisposition to commit such acts in the future, due to
Belleau's diagnosis as a pedophile.320 Considering the potential dangers of
recidivism, Judge Posner noted the Supreme Court's articulated concern
over sex offender recidivism. 32 1 Further, he cited to a number of studies
that attempted to quantify the number of rearrests for sex offenders
generally, 322 and included evidence specifically related to Belleau's risk.3 2 3
Noting that even if it is conceded that Belleau's risk, based upon his civil
commitment evaluations, was between 8-16% of reoffending, Judge
Posner quipped:
Readers of this opinion who are parents of young children should ask
themselves whether they should worry that there are people in their
community who have 'only' a 16 percent or an 8 percent probability of
molesting young children-bearing in mind the lifelong psychological
scars that such molestation frequently inflicts. 324
Accompanying the statistical likelihood of recidivism presented in studies,
Judge Posner maintained the possibility of recidivism in cases of sexual
assault is likely higher than reported, due in large part to the "serious
underreporting of sex crimes, especially sex crimes against children."32 5
In concluding the governmental interest in monitoring individuals
convicted of sexual assaults against children is a "nontrivial protection for
potential victims of child molestation," Judge Posner pivoted to an
examination of the individual interests.326 In analyzing what he described
as "the incremental effect of the challenged statute on the plaintiffs
privacy,"32 7 Judge Posner explained Belleau's privacy was already

320. Id at 932-33 ("In other words the plaintiff is a pedophile, which, as the
psychologist who evaluated him explained, 'predisposes [the plaintiff] to commit sexually
violent acts .

. .

. [I]t is well understood in my profession that pedophilia in adults cannot be

changed, and I concluded that Mr. Belleau had not shown that he could suppress or manage
his deviant desire."').
321. Id at 934 (noting "the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders and
their dangerousness as a class" and stating, "The risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is
'frightening and high"' (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) and McKune v.
Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002))).
322. Id at 933-34.
323. Id
324. Id
325. Id at 933 (citing to studies that suggested as many as 70-86% of child sexual
assault cases go unreported).
326. Id. at 934.
327. Id. at 934-35.
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diminished, given his previous criminal convictions. 3 2 8 Moreover, Judge
Posner elucidated any infringement upon Belleau's privacy was modest in
light of Wisconsin's previous laws that allow for public access to criminal
records and home addresses of sex offenders. 32 9 Recalling the requirement
that a privacy expectation must be one that the public is willing to accept as
reasonable,330 Judge Posner declared, "persons who have demonstrated a
compulsion to commit very serious crimes and have been civilly
determined to have a more likely than not chance of reoffending must
expect to have a diminished right of privacy as a result of the risk of their
*
. . . ,,331
recidivating
In addition to a consideration of the diminished privacy interests,
Judge Posner articulated the degree of the intrusion of electronic
monitoring on Belleau.332 Comparing the search to previous decisions by
the Supreme Court involving warrantless searches of parolees 333 and
probationers,334 he concluded, "The 'search' conducted in this case via the
anklet monitor is less intrusive than a conventional search."335 Judge
Posner noted the Department of Corrections makes a daily map of an
offender's locations so that if a sex crime has been committed in an area
where and when an offender was present, then the offender will be a
potential suspect for investigation. 33 6 Likewise, Judge Posner noted
monitoring could exculpate a sex offender if a sex crime has been
committed in an area where the offender was not present.337 Judge Posner
refused to acknowledge that the monitoring and mapping of sex offender
locations through GPS technology "burdens liberty. ,338 Instead, he offered
the use of monitoring "just identifies locations; it doesn't reveal what the
wearer of the device is doing at any of the locations."339 Further, he

328. Id. at 935 ("So the plaintiffs privacy has already been severely curtailed as a result
of his criminal activities, and he makes no challenge to that loss of privacy.").
329. Id. at 934-35. Judge Posner noted that Belleau did not challenge having his home
address and criminal records made public for anyone with internet access. Id. at 935.
330. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
331. Belleau, 811 F.3d at 935.
332. Id. at 936.
333. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846 (2006).
334. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114 (2001).
335. Belleau, 811 F.3d at 937.
336. Id. at 935.
337. Id. at 936 ("But by the same token if he was not at the scene of the crime when the
crime was committed, the anklet gives him an ironclad alibi." (emphasis in original)).
338. Id. at 936 (quoting Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 196-97 (Mass.
2009)).
339. Id
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maintained monitoring did not serve a general law enforcement purpose.340
Alternatively, the objective was "to deter future offenses by making the
plaintiff aware that he is being monitored and is likely therefore to be
apprehended should a sex crime be reported at a time, and a location, at
which he is present." 34 1 Given the important government interests against
the minimal privacy concerns, Judge Posner concluded the search was
reasonable.342
While agreeing with the ultimate conclusion reached by Judge Posner
and the majority, Judge Flaum wrote a separate concurrence utilizing
another approach to reasonableness. 343 Judge Flaum noted the cases cited
by the Supreme Court in its decision in Grady344 and determined "Grady
directs us to examine whether the search is reasonable by pointing to two
threads of Fourth Amendment case law: searches of individuals with
diminished expectation of privacy, such as parolees, and 'special needs'
searches." 345 And while he appears to plow the same ground as the
majority, Judge Flaum's concurrence provides a more nuanced approach to
consider Grady's "ultimate question" 346 for North Carolina.
Judge Flaum specifically identified the electronic monitoring of
Belleau as a reasonable "special needs" search.34 7 In doing so, he
articulated the purpose of the GPS tracking was not for the "normal need of
law enforcement." 3 4 8 Rather, he posited the monitoring of sex offenders
served an objective beyond law enforcement: namely "reduc[ing]
recidivism by letting offenders know that they are being monitored and
creat[ing] a repository of information that may aid in detecting or ruling out
involvement in future sex offenses."34 9 While he acknowledged the

340. Id.
341. Id. at 935.
342. Id. at 937.
343. Id. at 938 (Flaum, J., concurring).
344. Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) (per curiam) (citing Samson
v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 849-50 (2006) and Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 653-54 (1995)).
345. Belleau, 811 F.3d at 939 (Flaum, J., concurring). But see id. at 936 (majority
opinion). Judge Posner's opinion never classifies the lifetime monitoring as a "special
needs" search; however, it discusses that the main objective of monitoring is not for law
enforcement purposes. Id. As noted supra Part II-A, the courts have been less than clear as
to what exactly is a special need and how it differs from a reasonableness balancing test.
346. Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371.
347. Belleau, 811 F.3d at 939 (Flaum, J., concurring).
348. Id. (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653).
349. Id. at 940.
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location information could be used in a future criminal prosecution, Judge
Flaum declared this use was not the primary purpose of monitoring.35 0
Subsequently, Judge Flaum recognized that in the "special needs"
cases, the court must balance the governmental interests against the
individual interests. 3 5 1 In particular, he noted "the special needs balancing
inquiry is context specific." 3 5 2

Despite the strong public interest in

protecting children from sexual assaults, Judge Flaum accepted there are
substantial privacy interests with lifetime GPS monitoring. 3 5 3 Given the
fact lifetime monitoring "occurs constantly, lasts indefinitely, and is the
subject of periodic government scrutiny," Judge Flaum confessed, "this
monitoring program is uniquely intrusive, likely more intrusive than any
special needs program upheld to date by the Supreme Court." 354
Nevertheless, he concluded that under the "context-specific" situation
presented, the balance tipped in favor of a reasonable "special needs"
search.ss In the particular context, Judge Flaum identified Belleau had a
diminished expectation of privacy due to his previous convictions for sex
offenses. 356 Noting the Supreme Court's decisions of Samson357 and
Knights35 8 that recognized

diminished expectations

of parolees

and

probationers, Judge Flaum extended a similar rationale and stated, "Felons
also are expected to forfeit some of their constitutional rights as a result of
their status."359 Further, he maintained that although all felons forego some
of their rights due to conviction, there are greater restrictions placed on
convicted sex offenders, such as registration laws and commitment. 36 0
Considering the context-specific situation presented, Judge Flaum
350. Id. ("Indeed, the program is [set up] to obviate the likelihood of such
prosecutions.").
351. Id. at 941.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 940. Judge Flaum explained that GPS monitoring allows "the government to
'reconstruct someone's specific movements down to the minute,' generating 'a wealth of
detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations."' Id.
(quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014)).
354. Id.
355. Id. at 941 ("[D]espite the constitutional magnitude of the privacy interest at stake,
the monitoring scheme constitutes a reasonable special needs search. In my view, it does
not violate the [Fourth Amendment].").
356. Id at 940-41.
357. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 849-50 (2006).
358. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119-20 (2001).
359. Belleau, 811 F.3d at 941 (Flaum, J., concurring). Judge Flaum noted Judge
Easterbrook's suggestion that "a felon's expectation of privacy lies somewhere in-between
that of a parolee or probationer and an ordinary citizen." Id.
360. Id.
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concluded, "Although privacy is a value of constitutional magnitude, it
must yield, on occasion, to the state's substantial interest to protect the
public though reasonable regulations in appropriate circumstances." 36
Since the Grady decision, the North Carolina trial court that will have
to consider the "ultimate question",36 2 of reasonableness for Torrey Dale
Grady has the benefit of the decisions in Hallak and Belleau to establish
some of the legal and factual considerations. Questions, however, remain.
Below is an attempt to apply the rules for reasonableness to North
Carolina's lifetime satellite-based monitoring statutes.
IV. "I STILL HAVEN'T FOUND WHAT I'M LOOKING FOR" 363 : APPLYING
REASONABLENESS TO NORTH CAROLINA'S LIFETIME SATELLITE-BASED
MONITORING STATUTES

So how will North Carolina answer the "ultimate question" of Grady?
What must not be lost is that the "ultimate question" the North Carolina
courts must address whether it is reasonable to allow the State, through the
use of GPS technology, to conduct a warrantless and suspicionless "search"
of one of its residents for life. At first blush and based upon the paths taken
by Hallak and Belleau,3 64 it would appear that the answer will undoubtedly
point to reasonableness. But like all good questions, steeped in the Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence of resolving "reasonableness," the answer is far
from clear. What's more problematic in the particular case of Grady is that
we are confronted with a bare factual record, leaving us to speculate as to
its final resolution with reasonableness. The reality is, however, that more
cases, struggling to answer the question left open here, have followed,

361. Id. at 939.
362. Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) (per curiam).
363. U2, I Still Haven't Found What I'm Looking For, on THE JOSHUA TREE (Island
Records 1987).
364. See supra Part III.
365. Recently, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has noted the need for a specific
determination as to the reasonableness of the lifetime monitoring program. State v. Collins,
No. COA15-659, slip op. at 16 (N.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 16, 2016). In Collins, the Court
noted, "As part of Defendant's resentencing, the trial court shall also conduct a new hearing
on whether the imposition of lifetime satellite-based monitoring is consistent with
Grady... ." Id. See also State v. Blue, No. COAl5-837, slip. op. at 9 (N.C. Ct. App. filed
Mar. 15, 2016) and State v. Morris, No. COAl5-846, slip. op. at 5-6 (N.C. Ct. App. filed
Mar. 15, 2016), both of which reversed the trial court order and remanded for a new hearing
to determine if lifetime monitoring is reasonable as required by Grady). But see State v.
Alldred, Pitt County, No. COAl5-663, slip op. at 3 (N.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 16, 2016)
(noting that "Defendant also does not raise or argue any issues regarding the reasonableness
of the imposition of satellite-based monitoring under the Fourth Amendment").
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and will continue to come until the courts can reach an analytical
framework to provide guidance. Indeed, several hurdles remain.
The first important consideration is what test will North Carolina
courts utilize to address reasonableness? As noted above, the Grady
decision leaves at least two distinct scaffolds to build upon: (1) a special
needs exception, requiring some need beyond traditional law enforcement;
and (2) a general reasonableness exception based upon a particular context,
such as a diminished expectation of privacy. Or should both tests be
analyzed together? These questions remained unanswered in Grady since
the Court cited two cases that could take us in at least two different
directions. The Grady Court left no instructions on how to resolve this
important first step. The good news for lower courts, however, is that both
tests ultimately reach a similar destination that involves balancing
governmental and personal interests.
So far, the best attempt in traversing this first step is the concurrence
by Judge Flaum in the Belleau decision. 36 6 There, he carefully dissected
the Grady Court's cited cases of Vernonia and Samson, and analyzed
Wisconsin's GPS monitoring statutes under both a "special needs" search
and a context-specific reasonableness balancing of the governmental
interest and individuals with diminished expectation of privacy. 3 67 It is
through this lens of interpretation we should assess reasonableness in North
Carolina.
A.

"SpecialNeeds" Analysis

Considering the articulation of the "special need" apart from law
enforcement, it appears North Carolina would likely argue the SBM
program seeks to reduce recidivism of offenders and to protect the public
from harm.368 In essence, offenders will be deterred from committing
future acts of harm because they know they are being continually
monitored. Further, the State will likely note that while the information
obtained through the GPS monitoring of offenders may ultimately be
turned over to the police to serve a law enforcement goal, such as solving a
crime that occurred in the vicinity of a monitored individual, the purpose of
the information collected serves a "primary purpose" other than detecting

366. Belleau, 811 F.3d at 938 (Flaum, J., concurring). For a full discussion of his
concurrence, see supra Part III-B-2.
367. Id.at940-41.
368. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.5 (2015) ("The General Assembly recognizes that
sex offenders often pose a high risk of engaging in sex offenses even after being released
from incarceration or commitment and that protection of the public from sex offenders is of
paramount government interest.").
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"evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing."36 9 Further, the monitoring
will provide "an ironclad alibi" 3 7 0 in that it will exculpate an offender when
a crime has been reported in an area monitoring reveals the offender could
not have been at the time of the incident. As such, any secondary purposes
that may implicate traditional law enforcement goals will not render the
SBM program's "special need" unconstitutional.
Grady will likely respond that protection of the public is an illusory
justification, considering the program is not continually monitored in
real-time.3 7 1 In the end, the program, by tracking and keeping records of
the movements of sex offenders, impermissibly serves a traditional law
enforcement purpose of detecting evidence of criminal wrongdoing. 3 72
Moreover, even if the State's ultimate goal is to protect the public, the
"special needs" exception is not allowable when the State's "immediate
",373
objective" is to "generate evidence for law enforcement purposes ....
If the courts allow for such a broad justification for a warrantless and
suspicionless search, Grady will argue the justification for the exception
"would consume the rule."374 Accordingly, "virtually any nonconsensual
suspicionless search could be immunized under the special needs doctrine
by defining the search solely in terms of its ultimate, rather than immediate,
purpose." 375
So who wins this round of the debate? Indeed, both arguments are
plausible, and the State has the benefit of Judge Flaum's concurrence in
369. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 34, 38 (2000) (disapproving of
situations where the "primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing").
370. See Belleau, 811 F.3d at 936 ("But by the same token if he was not at the scene of
the crime when the crime was committed, the anklet gives him an ironclad alibi." (emphasis
in original)).
371. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief, supra note 87, at 15 ("Thus, no child is protected
because of the SBM program. If a registrant went to a daycare center, for example, the fact
that he was part of the SBM program would not prevent him from committing any crime,
except for perhaps the heightened fear that he would be caught afterwards.").
372. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38.
373. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83-84 (2001) (declining to extend
the "special needs" exception when "the immediate objective" is to "generate evidence for
law enforcement purposes," even though the "ultimate goal" may be beyond normal police
investigation purposes).
374. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief, supra note 87, at 15-16 ("The State could always
argue that it was not merely engaged in 'normal law enforcement' but was protecting the
victim group of that type of crime by catching more perpetrators, which prevents repeat
offenders (all convicts are more likely to re-commit their crime again than a normal citizen)
and dissuades would-be criminals from following through on their plans. This logical trick
always works.").
375. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84.
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Belleau for persuasive support that SBM satisfies a "special needs" search.
It must be noted, however, a judicial finding that North Carolina's SBM
program serves a special need apart from traditional law enforcement,
without more careful consideration, constitutes perhaps the most expansive
application of the "special needs" doctrine to date.37 6 Since the program's
application is tied to past criminal conduct-sexual offenses that mandate
GPS tracking-and is designed to monitor an offender in an effort to
protect the public against future criminal conduct, its purpose is intertwined
with those of traditional law enforcement. It is a sticky proposition to
attempt to separate non-law enforcement from criminal investigation
purposes. We cannot reach a conclusive determination on the question of
reasonableness, even as it relates to a "special needs" search, in a vacuum.
Vernonia reminds we must consider "context,"3 77 including a balancing of
the governmental and personal privacy interests.37 8
B.

"Context-Specific" Balancing ofIndividualPrivacy and
Governmental Interests

When considering the "nature and purpose" of the search at issue in
Through the
Grady, the individual privacy interests are substantial.
lifetime GPS monitoring of Grady, and others similarly situated, the State
is allowed unfettered continuous access to the comings and goings of
individuals without either a warrant or individualized suspicion. Grady
will likely argue monitoring such as this triggers even greater concerns than
Justice Sotomayor warned about in her concurrence in Jones.3 7 9 Indeed,
Grady will argue "[e]very moment . .. for the rest of his life, the State has
access to information regarding whether the registrant is at home, work, a

376. See, e.g., Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 940 (7th Cir. 2016) (Flaum, J., concurring)
("Accordingly, this monitoring program is uniquely intrusive, likely more intrusive than any
special needs program upheld to date by the Supreme Court.").
377. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995); see also Belleau,
811 F.3d at 940 (Flaum, J., concurring) ("Even if the program does serve a special need, one
must still 'undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing private

and public interests advanced by the parties."' (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,
314 (1997))).
378. See Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) (per curiam) ("The
reasonableness of a search depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature
and purpose of the search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable
privacy expectations.").

379. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
("In cases involving even short-term monitoring, some unique attributes of GPS surveillance
relevant to the Katz analysis will require particular attention. GPS monitoring generates a

precise, comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of
detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.").
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counselor's office, church, a gay bar, a drug rehab meeting, his mother's
house, his mistress' apartment, a union meeting, or any other matter of
place which reveals intimate information about his life."38 o Grady can go
nowhere in the State of North Carolina without the prying eye of the
government.
Likewise, the State's interests are arguably equally compelling.
Similar to the justifications for a "special needs" search above, the State
will likely counter the SBM statutes were created because of the substantial
governmental interest in protecting the public from the risks of recidivism
by known sex offenders. 3 8 1 The statutes specifically identify a group of
individuals in society that "pose a uniquely disturbing threat to public
safety."382 The State will cite to U.S. Supreme Court precedent stating,
"The risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is 'frightening and
high."'" But will a previous proclamation by the High Court 38 4 provide
sufficient support of the governmental interest? Should there be some type
of demonstrative evidence 3 85 mpirical or even anecdotal-to assess the
weight of the interest? Consider the battle over sex offender recidivism
data.
i.

The Debate over Data

As an initial foray into the topic of recidivism of sex offenders, there
are a number of issues. It has been noted, "recidivism of sex offenders is
difficult to measure,"38 6 and there are a litany of reasons why this may be

380. Defendant-Appellant's Brief, supra note 87, at 22-23.
381. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.5 (2015) ("The General Assembly recognizes that
sex offenders often pose a high risk of engaging in sex offenses even after being released
from incarceration or commitment and that protection of the public from sex offenders is of
paramount govemment interest.").
382. Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d at 938 (Flaum, J., concurring).
383. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34
(2002)).
384. See, e.g., McKune, 536 U.S. at 33 ("When convicted sex offenders reenter society,
they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or
sexual assault.").
385. Note that in McKune, the Court cited to statistics of sex offenders published by the
Department of Justice to support its conclusions. Additionally, both cases, Vernonia and
Samson, relied upon by the Supreme Court in Grady to assess reasonableness, cite to
evidence to support its conclusions.
386. ROGER PRZYBYLSKI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF ADULT SEXUAL
OFFENDERS 1 (2015), http://www.smart.gov/pdfs/RecidivismofAdultSexualOffenders.pdf
[https://perma.cc/43YF-LTRN].
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the case. 8 Within this environment, we must consider studies of sex
offender recidivism. According to a 1994 study of the release of 272,111
prisoners, 388 including 9,691 male sex offenders, approximately 43% of sex
offenders were rearrested for a new crime within three years of release.38 9
During the same three-year period, however, the recidivism rate for
non-sex offenders was 68%.390 When considering the recidivism rate for
offenders for sex crimes, although approximately 5.3% of released sex
offenders were rearrested for a new sex crime within three years, released
sex offenders were four times more likely to be rearrested for a new sex
crime than released non-sex offenders. 39 1
Another study of the recidivism rates of sex offenders revealed
arrestees of sex offenses had re-arrest rates for any offense of 21.3%,
37.4%, and 45.1% within one year, three years and five years after release,
respectively. 3 92 Compared with re-arrest rates for other crimes, such as
robbery where the rate for arrest on a new crime was 74.9% within five
years, sex offense recidivism rates for any crime appear significantly
lower. 39 3 In light of these numbers, is it fair to say that sex offender
recidivism is as significant of a concern as once thought?394 Are our
perceptions of sex offenders, their likelihood of recidivism, and the need
for additional protections warped by the news cycle? 39 5 In light of this
evidence, is there another possible answer?
387. See id. ("The surreptitious nature of sex crimes, the fact that few sexual offenses are
reported to authorities, and the variation in the ways researchers calculate recidivism rates
all contribute to the problem.").
388. The study considered the release of prisoners from fifteen states, including North
Carolina.
389. PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS
RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994, at 14 (2003), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/rsorp94.pdf [https://perma.cc/XMY9-UTCP].
390. Id.
391. Id. at 24.
392.

Lisa L.

Sample & Timothy M. Bray, Are Sex Offenders Dangerous?, 3

59, 72 (2003).
393. Id.
394. See, e.g., Brian P. LiVecchi, "The Least of These:" A Constitutional Challenge to
North Carolina'sSexual Offenders Laws and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14.208.8, 33 N.C. CENT. L.
REv. 53, 92 (2010) (noting that the assumption that sexual offenders have higher recidivism
rates "is flawed, and recent data suggests that sex offenders experience no higher rates of
recidivism than do other criminal offenders, and some studies show that they, in fact
experience less").
395. See Cynthia Calkins et al., Sexual Violence Legislation: A Review of Case Law and
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y

Empirical Research, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 443, 443 (2014) ("In examining the

specific restrictions involved in these legislative efforts, many sex offense policies seem
rooted in stereotypical images of sex offenders that derive from cases garnering
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One explanation for the lower numbers may be that sex offenses are
often underreported. 3 96 It has been suggested that anywhere from 70%397 to
86%398 of child sexual assaults are not reported to the police. 39 9 If these
underreporting statistics are even remotely close to portraying an accurate
picture on the number of sex offenses nationwide, any assessment of sex
offender recidivism statistics must be considered with reservations. But
even assuming sex offender recidivism rates are perhaps lower than
expected, the fact remains that some sex offenders can and do commit other
crimes and the State of North Carolina has sought to protect its citizens. 40 0
Given the Supreme Court's stated recognition of the threat of recidivism of
sex offenders, 4 0 1 and the statistical evidence to support the proposition,
albeit not as strong as initially believed, the governmental purpose remains
strong.
Even though the State may have a strong interest in the protection of
the public, this does not address whether the nature and purpose of the
intrusion in the form of lifetime GPS monitoring adequately meets its
stated interest, especially in light of the serious intrusion upon the
individual. In assessing the efficacy of whether satellite-based monitoring
for sex offenders serves as a deterrent, the reality is there has been little

extraordinary media attention, despite a great variation in the nature of offenses that sex
offenders commit, the types of victims they target, and their motivations for committing
such crimes.").
396. See Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 933 (7th Cir. 2016) ("There is serious
underreporting of sex crimes, especially sex crimes against children.").
397. DAVID FINKLEHOR ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEXUALLY ASSAULTED CHILDREN:
NATIONAL ESTIMATES AND CHARACTERISTICS 8 (2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf

files I /ojjdp/214383.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA93-8SAR].
398. See DEAN G. KILPATRICK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, YOUTH VICTIMIZATION:
PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 6 (2003), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/194972.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YN7T-8P6X].
399. See PRZYBYLSKI, supra note 386, at I (noting "there is widespread recognition that
the officially recorded recidivism rates of sexual offenders are a diluted measure of
reoffending").
400. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.5 (2015) ("Therefore, it is the purpose of this Article
to assist law enforcement agencies' efforts to protect communities by requiring persons who
are convicted of sex offenses or of certain other offenses committed against minors to
register with law enforcement agencies, to require the exchange of relevant information
about those offenders among law enforcement agencies, and to authorize the access to

necessary and relevant information about those offenders to others as provided in this
Article.").
401. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003).
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research at present.402 Of the research presently available on this topic, the
question of deterrence remains open.403
A recent one-year study of 1,300 eligible sex offenders in Tennessee,
of which half were subjected to GPS monitoring, found there were "no
statistically significant differences" between the GPS monitored offenders
and those who were not subject to GPS monitoring.4 04 Yet another study of
516 sex offenders-half of those under GPS surveillance-determined
sex-related parole violations were three times greater for sex offenders who
were not under GPS monitoring. 405 Finally, a two-year study of the use of
GPS monitoring of 784 high-risk gang offenders, with half subjected to
GPS tracking, revealed GPS monitoring reduced arrest rates by almost
10%.406 Surprisingly, however, the rate of return to custody for those who
were under GPS surveillance was almost 10% more than those who were
not. 40 7 While there is some empirical evidence about the deterrence value
of GPS monitoring, more study is needed.408
In addition to the statistical evidence of GPS tracking, there has been
limited anecdotal evidence on its effectiveness. The California Office of
the Inspector General interviewed sixty-five sex offender parolees under
GPS surveillance.40 9 More than half of the parolees "stated that knowing a
parole agent was watching and could learn where they had been was a
402. See Calkins et al., supra note 395, at 456 ("To date, research examining how GPS
monitoring affects recidivism has been somewhat limited.").
403. See Kristen M. Budd & Christina Mancini, Public Perceptions of GPS Monitoring
for Convicted Sex Offenders: Opinions on Effectiveness of Electronic Monitoringto Reduce
Sexual Recidivism, INT'L J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY, Dec. 31, 2015,
at 2 (noting "to date no national study has analyzed public perceptions in relation to the
effectiveness of a debated and far-reaching reform").
404. TENN. BD. OF PROB. & PAROLE, MONITORING TENNESSEE'S SEX OFFENDERS USING
GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS 24 (2007).
405. CAL. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SPECIAL REVIEW: ASSESSMENT OF ELECTRONIC
MONITORING OF SEX OFFENDERS ON PAROLE AND THE IMPACT OF RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS 7
(2014).
406.

See STEPHEN V. GIES ET AL., MONITORING HIGH-RISK GANG OFFENDERS WITH GPS

TECHNOLOGY: AN EVALUATION OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPERVISION PROGRAM FINAL REPORT

3-6 (2013).
407. Id. at 3-7 ("This is somewhat surprising in view of fewer treatment parolees
rearrested in general and rearrested for a violent offense; however, we can hypothesize that
this difference may be related to the increased ability to detect and investigate crimes and
parole violations using GPS tracking technology.").
408. See Calkins et al., supra note 395, at 457 ("As the use of this technology for
monitoring sex offenders is still in its relative naissance, it is difficult to draw formal
conclusions on its effectiveness . . . . That said, research here offers promise that electronic
monitoring could serve as a useful tool in the community management of sex offenders.").
409. See CAL. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 405, at 8.
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factor in the behavioral decisions they made and in their activities."4 1 0 In
addition to parolees, parole officers were interviewed. 4 11 The officers
noted GPS tracking assisted them in identifying or eliminating a parolee as
a suspect of a crime as well as helped them in enforcing parole conditions
such as geographic restrictions.4 12
To date, the research is far from conclusive as to just how effective
satellite-based monitoring is at reducing recidivism. Perhaps the problem
here is with the whole process of searching for empirical and anecdotal
evidence to support or deny a claim for reasonableness. Much like the
potential dilemma of using legislative history to support a particular view
of statutory interpretation, one can find substantiation for either position. A
utilization of statistical analysis in this area runs the risk similar to what
Judge Leventhal warned regarding legislative history in that it is like
"looking over a crowd and picking out your friends."4 13 Data can be
important, but it can be a deceiving tourist trap on the road to
reasonableness.
ii.

DiminishedExpectations

While the campaign continues on whether Torrey Grady's individual
intrusion tips the scales over the government's interest, we must take a
detour into an inquiry hinted at in the Grady decision's notation of Samson:
whether a recidivist sex offender, subjected to lifetime monitoring, has a
diminished expectation of privacy? If the answer is yes, are the scales
tipped in favor of reasonableness of the search? Indeed, the moment the
Grady Court cited Samson as guidance in answering the "ultimate
question," lower courts were put on a collision course to resolve the
reasonable expectation of privacy of a felon generally, and in the case of
Grady specifically, a sex offender who has already served his sentence for
the crime.
In answering this question, the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence is
far from helpful. On the one end of the spectrum, we know prisoners have
no reasonable expectation of privacy.4 14 In stark contrast, however, the
Court has discussed privacy in terms of "absolute liberty" and "freedoms
enjoyed by law-abiding citizens." 415 The middle is murkier as the Court

410. Id.
411. Id. at 7.
412. Id.
413. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983).
414. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984).
415. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. i12, 119 (2001).
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recognized that parolees, who are subject to suspicionless and warrantless
searches, have "fewer expectations of privacy than probationers,'41 6 and are
subject to warrantless searches based upon reasonable suspicion. 4 17 So
where does a recidivist sex offender fit into the calculus? Good question.
Judge Flaum, in his concurrence in Belleau, posited it is expected that
felons give up some rights, and their "expectation of privacy lies
somewhere in-between that of a parolee or probationer and an ordinary
citizen. ,,418 So w
what is society willing to accept as reasonable when it
comes to privacy expectations of sex offenders? Is it fair to say a sex
offender's privacy rights are more diluted than other felons? 4 19 It would
seem the answer to this question may be yes, in that sex offenders are
already subject to diminished expectations of privacy far beyond other
felons in that many, and certainly all of those subject to lifetime SBM, are
required to register as a sex offender. 42 0
The many registration
requirements sex offenders are required to disclose include: name, alias,
birthdate, sex, race, height, weight, eye color, hair color, driver's license
number, home address, sex offense conviction, recent photograph,
fingerprints, a statement whether the offender is or intends to be a student
within one year of registration, a statement whether the offender is or
intends to be employed at a higher education institution, and any online
identification the offender intends to use. 4 2 1 Additionally, most states,
including North Carolina, post sex offender information on a public
website so individuals can search the registry to discover who the offenders
are and whether an offender lives near their home.422
Due to the vast amounts of private information readily available
concerning individual sex offenders, is it fair to say the SBM program is
nothing more than an "incremental effect" on privacy? 423 Of course,

416. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006).
417. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 121.
418. Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 941 (7th Cir. 2016) (Flaum, J., concurring).
419. See id (noting the proposition that sex offenders privacy rights are somewhere
between a parolee or probationer and an ordinary citizen "is clearly true of convicted sex
offenders, who are commonly subjected to restrictions beyond that of an ordinary felon,
such as mandatory registration laws and civil commitment").
420. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.7 (2015) ("A person who is a State resident and who
has a reportable conviction shall be required to maintain registration with the sheriff of the
county where the person resides.").
421. See id.
422. See, e.g., North Carolina's Sex Offender Registry, N.C. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY,
http://sexoffender.ncsbi.gov/ [https://perma.cc/BGC4-LT9G].
423. See Belleau, 811 F.3d at 934-35 ("The focus must moreover be on the incremental
effect of the challenged statute on the plaintiffs privacy, and that effect is slight given the
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lifetime GPS monitoring is a significant privacy intrusion upon the
individual in that an offender's everyday movements are observed and
recorded. But that is not to say that society will accept the privacy
expectations as reasonable. Some important observations should be made.
First, GPS monitoring, as it exists in North Carolina, is far less
intrusive than initially thought. During the year of 2013-14, approximately
111 individuals were enrolled in North Carolina's lifetime SBM
program.4 24 Additionally, there were approximately 325 monitored sex
offenders in the state.425 The total number of officers who handle the
tracking and monitoring of these offenders is two. 4 2 6 Yes, two officers in
the entire State of North Carolina are watching lifetime sex offenders. It
appears that given this sizable population, it would be impossible for the
officers to keep up with all of the churches attended, mistresses visited, and
drug rehab meetings frequented of all the enrollees.
Instead, the
monitoring program appears to be considerably more passive than
suggested by Grady.
So what is its purpose? In short, although the State may record and
ultimately review the whereabouts of the monitored offender, given the size
of the population, absent some sort of individualized suspicion of either the
offender or a crime reported near offenders, the GPS monitoring ultimately
serves as a deterrent to recidivism for the offender, rather than a prying eye
into all personal affairs. It seems the program is designed with the idea that
big brother could be watching, and therefore offenders should conform
their behavior, rather than big brother is watching and cares about what bar
they frequent.427
Second, could it just be that sex crimes are different and the rules for
reasonableness should also be adjusted appropriately to address society's
reasonable expectations of privacy in this arena? It was the legislature's
decision by Wisconsin-which he does not challenge-to make sex offenders' criminal
records and home addresses public.").
424. See Memorandum from Frank L. Perry & W. David Guice to N.C. Dep't of Pub.
Safety Adult Corr. & Juvenile Justice 11 (Feb. 19, 2015) (on file with author).
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. See, e.g., Belleau, 811 F.3d at 936 ("So let's recapitulate the gain to society from
GPS monitoring of convicted sexual molesters. Every night as we said a unit of the
Department of Corrections downloads the information collected that day by the anklet
monitor and creates a map showing all the locations at which the wearer was present during
the day and what time he was present at each location. Should a sexual offense be reported
at a location and time at which the map shows the person wearing the anklet to have been
present, he becomes a suspect and a proper target of investigation. But by the same token if
he was not at the scene of the crime when the crime was committed, the anklet gives him an
ironclad alibi.").
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determination that protection from sex offenders is of paramount
importance that caused it to pass sex offender statutes, such as the SBM
program, in the first place. Indeed, society seems to approve of the
electronic monitoring programs. 4 2 8 Should we not allow society to
establish acceptable levels of intrusiveness and simply say sex offenders
are different? Before rushing out onto this assertion, a sober consideration
must be made that at times, and even in the cases of sex offender programs,
public perception is not always fact.429
iii. Some Final Comparisonsof the Existing Grady Application to
Cases of Hallak and Belleau
North Carolina courts will not have to forge blindly into a
reasonableness inquiry when considering its SBM program in light of the
Grady decision. Fortunately, other courts have weighed into the muddle,
but how helpful are their considerations? While the cases of Hallak and
Belleau provide a framework for legal analysis, 430 are there factual
distinctions in those cases that render its application hollow?
It is worth noting specifically when these individuals were subjected
to lifetime monitoring, and whether the monitoring immediately followed a
conviction for a sex offense. Although the Hallak decision was the first
reported case in the country to apply the Grady test to its electronic
monitoring statutes, its direct application to the facts in Grady are
distinguishable. Hallak's lifetime monitoring was directly linked to his
punishment for his conviction of a sex crime.431 In fact, the Hallak court
surmised lifetime monitoring was acceptable because the legislature was
cognizant of monitoring when it established prison sentences for sexual
offenses.43 2 Yet, the circumstances of Belleau more closely mirror those in
Grady. Belleau had already served his sentence for his sexual offense,
similar to Torrey Grady.43 3 In fact, analogous to Grady, the lifetime

428. See Budd & Mancini, supra note 403, at 9 (noting that in their polling of over 1,000
people from across America, "approximately 32% of Americans thought that GPS/EM
[monitoring] was very effective, 47% thought it was somewhat effective, I1% thought it
was somewhat ineffective, 6% thought it was not at all effective, and 3% were unsure of its
effectiveness").
429. See id. at 14 ("This research suggests that some myths, in part, increase the public's
belief that GPS/EM [monitoring] is very effective at reducing sexual recidivism of
convicted sex offenders.").
430. See supra Part III.
431. See People v. Hallak, 873 N.W.2d 811, 820-21 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015), rev'd on
other grounds, 876 N.W.2d 523 (Mich. 2016) (mem.).
432. See id.
433. See Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 931 (7th Cir. 2016).
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monitoring statute in Belleau was created after he had served his time for
the sex offense.434
While the above comparison between Belleau and Grady is
complementary, the two cases differ significantly in the individualized
assessment of the offender. There are consequential differences between
Belleau and Grady in that Belleau was civilly committed to a treatment
facility as a "sexually violent person."4 35 Additionally, mental health
professionals diagnosed Belleau as a pedophile, and evaluated his
likelihood of reoffending.4 36 In sharp delineation, however, there has not
been an individualized assessment of Grady's probability of reoffending. 4 3 7
The question remains whether the State's interest in recidivism of sex
offenders without actual assessment, like Grady, is commensurate with
those of offenders, like Belleau, where a court can quantify recidivist
tendencies of the individual.438
V.

"WE'VE COME TO THE END OF THE ROAD" 439 : PRESENTING FINAL
OBSERVATIONS ON REASONABLENESS

In spite of the dearth of clarity to the many questions considered
above, it seems likely that the North Carolina courts will follow its sister
courts in Hallak and Belleau, and conclude the SBM program is
reasonable. Indeed, it may be that a decision for reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment here will constitute a Pyrrhic victory, won at the
considerable cost to individual privacy. Veritably, if the court upholds
lifetime GPS monitoring of individuals as reasonable, such a ruling pushes
the outside of the envelope for suspicionless and warrantless searches. And
much like the world in 1957 could not have envisioned the complexities the
future brought with Sputnik, it is beyond comprehension where our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence will take us next.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. The record on appeal to the court of appeals contains the judicial findings from
Judge Young at Grady's SBM hearing. There is no further evidence concerning whether the
trial court made further findings, other than Grady's prior convictions trigger mandatory
monitoring.
438. See, e.g., Eric M. Dante, Tracking the Constitution-theProliferationand Legality
of Sex-Offender GPS-Tracking Statutes, 42 SETON HALL L. REv. 1169, 1222-23 (2012)
("[A]ny decision to impose GPS-tracking on a sex offender needs to be based on an
individualized risk assessment and not, as most statutes are currently written, based on the
crime committed.").
439. Boyz II MEN, End of the Road, on BOOMERANG (soundtrack) (LaFace Records
1992).
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Should the High Court eventually consider the "ultimate question" left
open in its Grady decision, the resolution is in doubt. In fact, the whole
aggregate of its pronouncements on reasonableness, both past and future,
has been shrouded in ambiguity. Currently, the Court is ensnared in
darkness over the future of its ideological understanding of the Fourth
Amendment. Justice Scalia's death casts a long shadow over the evenly
divided eight Justice Court. Where does the Court go from here? Only
time will tell.
With Justice Scalia's death, will the Court return to an exclusive
preference for the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test for a search?
Will the newly revived trespass test, brought back to life by Justice Scalia,
now be at rest again in Scalia's death? Unquestionably, the Grady decision
itself rests firmly upon a trespass-based foundation laid by Justice Scalia's
opinions in Jones and Jardines. With Justice Scalia's death, will the Court
pivot to a new old rule in Katz? Without even turning to the "ultimate
question" of reasonableness, will the outcome that GPS monitoring is a
search be the same?
And as both political parties roll out their partisan artillery in the
crusade over when a new Justice should be nominated and confirmed, an
even greater question remains: what is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment? Have the rules changed since February 13, 2016, the day
Scalia died? Will the Court return to a presumption of warrants, declaring
as it did in Katz that searches without warrants are per se unreasonable?
Undeniably, if the Court returns to assess the Reasonableness Clause
by blending its understanding of search and seizures with the Warrant
Clause, then it may be that GPS monitoring-much like the beeper case of
Karo, decided long ago when the Court read the clauses together-would
likely be viewed as an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.
Similar to the tracker in Karo, modern GPS reveals details intimate to the
home that an individual possesses an expectation of privacy to be free from
governmental intrusions, in the absence of a warrant or well-delineated
exception. Or will the court continue to track searches and seizures under
the pole star of reasonableness in the universe of uncertainty and
unpredictability that is the Fourth Amendment? For now, all we can do is
look to the heavens, wonder, and listen for a faint signal from the Court.
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